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Introduction 
With the ratification of tbe Bill of Right~ in 1?91, 
the framers -of the Constitution guaranteed every citizen 
the unabridgeable right to express his or .her opinion 
freely and without · fear of government reprisal • . This gua-
ranty was simultaneously reinforced by granting the same 
freedom to the press, thus providing a vehicle for such 
1 
expression.· 
Today, the Constitution has been subjected to a vast 
number of interpretations. Generation after generation 
has styled these interpretations to fit their needs, but 
what about the needs of citizens, as individuals, to 
express themselves? The geometric progression of modern 
technological development has and is constantly increas-
2 
ing the speed of the -communication process. This rapid 
increase in technology has forced the tools for expr~s­
sion into ·the hands of a minority of highly skilled com~ 
municators and has made it difficult, i£ not impossible, 
for an individual to express his opinion to the rest of 
1 
u.s. Const. Amendo I. 
2 
D.L. Sha , "Technologys Freedom From What?," Mass 
Media and the National Experience, eds. T. Farrar and J. 
Stevens;-(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 64-84, 
1 
his community. Yet, the Constitution still gives him the 
right to do so. 
2 
It would therefore seem logical that today•s citizen 
use all those media and vehicles, provided him by today•s 
technoaogy in order to express an opinion. . However, every-
day realities make it impractical for every citizen to 
print an articlet rite a column; or be heard over the 
airwaves. These impracticalities narrow the· citizen's 
alternatives for expression. One alternative which is 
both practical from the citizen's point of view and pro-
fitable for the community as a whole is the institution 
most commonly used in the everyday business world-- · 
J 
advertising~ 
I 
~ The idea to use this commercial institution as a way 
to express opinions openly and with a minimal amount of 
editing is not a novel one. As stated by Mr. c ·. H. 
Sandage. "the institution of advertising has many facets, 
one of which is to serve as an instrument of communica-
tion. This facet could be used by anyone who has senti-
4 
m.ents to express, as a method to have his voice heard," 
Advertising for the purpose of expressing opinions is 
J 
David Potter, Peo}le of Plenty, (Chicago• 
of Chicago Press, 1954 • pp. 168-171. 
4 
University 
C. H. Sandage • "Using Advertising to I mple ment the 
Concept of Freedom of Speech," The Role of Advertising, 
eds, Co H. Sandage and v. Fryburgert (Homewood, Illinois• 
Richard Irwin Inc., 1960), pp. 222-3. 
not, however, quite the same· as commercial adv~rtising. 
This differentiation will be pointed out later in . the text. 
This type of advertising, also, must be identifi~d. T.he 
label for advertising of this nature has been -and, henceforth 
. 5 . 
shall be ~eferred to as editorial advertising, Editorial 
advertising is defined as a spot of time or space paid for 
by individuals or groups for the purpose of expressing opi-
6 
nions on issues of public importance. 
Advertising for this purpose has been used in print 
? 
media, but recent court rulings have seriously questioned 
8 
its use in broadcast media. It has also been used in 
other media. 
ST TEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose . of this study is to analyze various aspects 
of editorial advertising in an effort to determine if its 
continued and expanded use can serve as a modern means of 
5 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 11 L. ed, 2nd. 698 (1964). 
· 6 
Business Executives• Movement for Vietnam Peace, 
25 F.c.c. 2nd, 242 (1970). 
7 
New York Times v. Sullivan. 
8 
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National 
Commit ee1 Federal Communication Co mmission v. Business 
Executives• Movement for Vietnam P acea Post-Newsweek 
Stations, Capital Area Inc. v~ B,E.Mor American Broad-
casting Company v. D.N,C. 41 LW 4688 (1973). 
free expression. It is intended that this analysis might 
also serve as a compendium to facilitate decision making 
for any and all persons ho consider the use of paid space 
or time to express an opinion. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
4 
In order to determine whet·her editorial advertising can 
be used further as a means of free expression, the follo-
wing questions must be answereds 
1. How does editorial advertising differ from other 
forms of advertising and from ot·her 'forms of edi-
torializing? 
2. Wha~ is the existing legal and practical status 
of editorial advertising? 
METHODOLOGY 
The research questions po~ed and the uniqueness of the 
phenomenon under investigation suggested that a library 
9 
survey be conducted. In addition,an analysis is being 
conducted. It focuses on the technical differences and 
the constitutional background, as well as the legal status 
and the practical ses of editorial advertising. 
The library survey is divided into three major areas. 
The first area is a revie of the relevant literature on 
9 
William Sattler, MThe Library Survey," An Introduc-
tion to Graduate Study in Speech and Theatre,-ed. Clyde w. 
Do (East Lansing. Mich.a Michigan State University Press, 
1 961 ) • p • J 2 • 
5 
free speech and First Amendment interpretations. The second 
major area focuses on the institution of advertising as a 
general means of communication and, more specifically, on 
editorial advertising as a means of free expression. This 
area also looks at other forms of editorializing and differ-
ent types of advertising. The third major area reviews 
both the legal and · practical status of -editorial adverti-
sing. This .area also involves the key issue of access to 
the media. 
Sections reviewing the legal status are limited to 
those agency, appellate court, a~d _supreme court decisions 
which directly involve the use of editorial advertising. 
Chapter 1 
FREE EXPRESSION IN PERSPECTIVE 
Congress shall make no law respecting an esta-
blishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.lO 
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE 
Consideration of any method for implementing free 
expression must rest upon a basic ·understanding of the First 
Amendment and its interpretations. Essential to such an 
understanding, is the vie ing of thi~ amendment within the 
11 
contextual framework of its origin. purpose and meaning. 
The origin of the amendment dates to the late 1780's 
at which time there was concern for revising the newly 
adopted Constitution to include safeguards for individual 
freedoms. During this same period, there surfaced a uni-
que attitudeo It regarded free expression as a function of 
an individual's speech and writing, as well as the tradi-
10 
u.s. Const. Amend. I. 
11 
Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin. and Ron Jackson, 
Pragmatics of Human Co mmunication, {New Yorka W. • 
Norto·n & Company, 1967), pp. 19-Zi6. 
6 
7 
tional use of the press. To put it more bluntly. "free 
speech" was attitudinally eleva ed to· .a position which had 
previously been held only by the "free press" concept, 
This attit.ude a·pP.ears to .have. be.en another manifestation 
of the democratic zeitgeist. 
Further -evidence of this attitude pervades the research 
of George Anastaplo who states 0 "Un'til the establishment 
of the American Repub.lic., 'liberty of the pr·ess• had been 
emphasized when freedom of expression for the public at 
large was provided. 'Freedom of speech' ••• ean be said to 
have been expanded by the First Amendment to include the 
12 
entire population •• " 
This same attitude, as to the meaning of the First 
r 
Amendment, was mo·st clearly stat-e-d by the major author of 
the Bill of Rights, James Madison. ~adison justified amend~ 
ing the Constitution with a lengthy speech in 1789 herein 
he referred _to the proposed First Amendment. It as worded 
thus, • ••• The people shall not be deprived or abridged of 
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their senti-
mentsz and .the freedom of the press, as one of the great 
13 
bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolableGe•' It should 
also be pointed out that Madison's wording of the amendment 
12 
George Anastaplo The Constitutionalists Notes on 
the First Amendment, (Dallas& Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1971), p. 125. 
13 
Bernard Schwartz The .Bill of Righ s r A Documenta ry 
History, II (New York• Chelsea House Publishers and McGra 
Hi 11 Inc , , 1 9 71 ) , p • 1 o·2 6 • 
8 
had been suggested to him by various State conventions and 
individual representatives. 
The First Amendment, at the time of its origin, can 
be said to have reflected the attitude that free ~peech and 
free press be conscribed into a basic right of free communi-
cative· expre.ssion, This attitude must not, however, be 
construed as the purpose or meaning of the amendment, but 
rather the philosophy held by its originators. 
·. The purpose of the amendment was to lay the groundwork 
for the maintenance of the values and philosophies expo.unded 
in the late Eighteenth Century Republic. This maintenance 
could be realized with a general and flexible groundrule 
which established an absolute right. The First Amendment 
was and.'is one of the fe laws set don in the Constitution 
which projects the foresight of its authors. Their fore-
sight was seasoned with a tradition of press freedom found 
in their Anglo-Saxon culture. Because of. this tradition, 
tempered ith their new attitude, the originators of the 
First Amendment purposefully sought to guaranty an entire 
14 
system of Tree expression. 
A "systematic" vie of the First Amendment's purpose 
also supports the unique attitude of individual free speech 
and a free press as being complementary. Indeed, a free 
press could be the vehicle for an individual's exercise of 
14 
Thomas Emerson. Toward A General Theory of The 
Firat Amendment, (New Yorkt Vintage Books, 19b7), p. viii. 
free speech. A "systematic" view also ensures a ••method 
of securing participation by the members of the society in 
1.5 
social, including political, decision making." Thus a 
system of free expression, by guaranteeing an absolute 
right, can adapt to societal changes over periods of time. 
This, then~~as the purpose of the First Amendment. 
CHANGING INTERPRETATION 
The First Amendment, like the entire Constitution, has 
9 
been interpreted by each generation of Americans to meet 
their needs for expression, as perceived at the time. Inter-
pretations, while changing and differing to meet these needs, 
have not necessarily detracted from the amendment's pri-
ma~y purpose •• ~the institutionalizing of a durable system 
for free expression. 
Interpretations of the First Amendment are also changing, 
like Toffler's "Discovery, Application, Impact" continuum, 
19 
at an increased rate. For example, when a new interpreta-
tion is accepted and applied, its impact sets precedents or 
creates problems that, in turn, demand newer interpretations. 
Thus, there is a need for new interpretations to meet acceler-
a~ing technical and social changes and the constant need of 
free expression maintenance. 
The job of interpreting the First Amendment has, since 
the ratification of the Constitution, been assigned to the 
15 
Ibid., p. 9. 
16 . Fu Alv1n Toffler, ture Shock, (New Yorks Random 
House, 1970), pp. 19-35. 
10 
Supreme Court of the United States. The justices who com-
prise this body have ·, for the past couple of decades, 
become increasingly aware of the need to fo ulate their 
interpretations with -respect to the rapidly increasing 
t~chnological and social changes. William Hachten suc-
cintly i~~~atrates the Court's awareness of rapid change 
and free e~pression needs when he states: 
. I 
The Supreme Court has had to cope ith the 
technological revolution that has shaped mas~ com-
munications in this century. In the days of small, 
hand-printed news sheets, James Madison and the 
architects of the First Amendment could not forsee 
giant high-speed rotary presses, network television, 
communication satellites, motion pictures, radio, or 
orld-wide ne s agencies strung together by teletype 
and telephone. · But had _they had such foresight, it 
is unlikely that they would have · rewritten the First 
Amendment ·e It is part· of the · genius of our Consti-
tution tha t each generation can adapt the document's 
broad enduring principles to the changing needs of 
time .17 
Modern interpretation of the First Amendme~t not 
only reflects an awareness of increasing technology and 
increasing free expression needs, but also suggests the 
testing of a new means to maintain the free expression 
system. Speaking on this point Supreme Court Justice 
Brennan has stated, "Thus, although 'full and free dis-
cussion' of ideas may have been a reality ·in the heyday 
of political pamphleteering, modern technological develop-
ments in the field of communications have made the soapbox 
1? 
illiam Hachten, The Supreme Court Qn Freedom of 
the Pressp (Ames, Iowaa The Io a State University Press, 
19b8}, p. 6. 
11 
18 
orator and the leafleteer virtually obsolete.u This ob-
solesence of the soapbox in the square and the handbill .type 
of pamphlet, as vehicles within the free expression system, 
suggests that other .vehicles for carrying out the same func-
tion be devised, The present technology can dictate the 
device · and the modern interpretations of the First Amend-
- - -· 
ment can maintain the free expression system. 
MAINTAINING THE FREE EXPRESSION 
SYSTEM TODAY 
Technology · has forced upon interpreters of the First 
Amendment, as well as today•s society in general, the need 
for new methods to maintain free speech and free press con-
cepts, This same technology can also satisfy these needs, 
but technology alone may not be enough, Likewise, the 
institutionalizing of free expression by the First Amend-
ment may not, by itself, maintain ·free expression. 
_·Maintenance of a system of free expression also 
.· 
depends on practical, day-by-day method~ for individuals 
and groups to lay their ideas and opinions before the pub-
lie. Furthermore, in the ords of Thomas Emersons 
eeean effective system of freedom of expression 
requires a realistic administrative structure. It 
is not enough to merely formulate the broad principles 
or simply to incorporate them in general rules of 
law~ It is necessary to develop a frame ork of doc-
trines, practices ·, and institutions which ill take 
into account the actual · forces at work and make 
possible the realistic achievement of the objectives 
18 
Justice Brennan, 47 LW 4719. 
12 
so.ught •. 19 
The objective sought in this case is the self-fulfill-
ment o·f individ"Ual and group needs for expression, And, as 
Emerson pointed out, the day-by-day methods for achieving 
.. 
this objective lies in formulating .. new do.ctrines .and insti-
tutions. 
The purposes of this chapter and this study are not 
.. 
to develop a doctrine for free expression. In~tead, they 
are to give the reader a perspective of ~he First Amendment 
and then to consider a new method for maintaining . the free 
expression system. Therefore, the last part ' of Emerson's 
framework--:---the ·.(modern) institutio.fl, emerges as a method 
to implement free expression. 
Any institution, by its nature, cannot ··radically 
change the present system for c.ommunicating inforll's.tion, 
ideas, and opinions into some Orwellian nightmare. Any 
method .chosen, therefore, must work within the present 
· communication systems, 
This is not to say, however,- that a new method cannot 
eliminate -errors or improve upon the performance of the 
present system. Thomas Emerson, calling for an "affirma-
tive promotion of freedom of expression" says, "There are 
numerous reasons for the failures now threatening the 
existence of the system (of free expression). Probably the 
most significant is the overpowering monopoly over the 
19 
Tho as Emerson The ~yst·em of Freedom of Expression, 
{Ne York& Random House Inc., 1970), p. ·4. • 
13 
20 
means of communication acquired by the mass media." This 
same point of view is supported by Zechariah Chafee Jr. 
who views the concentrated power of today's mass media 
as an antithesis to the essential conditions for a healthy 
public opinion, the essential conditions being a diversity 
21 
of ~xpre~~~d views. 
A new method for maintaining the purpose of the First 
Amendment in t~day•s society should be an institution which 
can work within the present communications media, while also 
eliminating some of the failures which the media have had 
due to their monopolistic position. 
An institution for the maintenance of free expression 
does exist in the form of modern advertising. Within this 
institution, a method also exists by which individuals and 
groups can still achieve free speech without radically dis-
rupting the present communications media. This institution · 
and this method will be thoroug~~Y examined in the next 
chapter. 
SUMMARY 
Muc-h of this chapter has focused on the background of 
free expression as embodied in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, Specific attention was focused on the atti-
tudes held by James Madison and other originators of the 
20 
Ibid. , p. 6 2 7 • 
21 
Zechariah Chafee Jr.~ Government and Mass Commun~cat~, (Chicago& University of Chicago Fress,-r947J. pp. 21- 9. 
14 
Bill of Rights to show that the dual concepts of free 
speech and free press were, in fact, at least complementary 
if not synonymous when the amendment was created·· 
This chapter also pointed out that the basic purpose 
of the amendment was to establish an entire system of free 
expressi<;)l.l _Which could adapt to changing times. With a 
systematic view in mind, the complementary role of free 
speech and free press assumed greater meaning. fhe press, 
in accordance with the attitude surrounding First Amend-
ment composition, could be seen as a vehic-le for free 
speech. 
Interpretations of the First Amendment, while differing 
over time, did not necessarily detract from the amendment's 
basic purpose. Furthermore, modern Supreme Court interpre-
tations were shown -to reflect an awareness of the demands 
of modern technology. 
And finally, it was suggested that a method to maintain 
the free expression system would have to include not only 
modern interpretations of the amendment, but also an insti-
tution whi~h could work within the present mass communi-
cations systems to eliminate past mistakes and still pro-
vide individual self-fulfillment. It was further suggested 
that maintenance of the free expression system could be 
accomplished by the modern institution of advertising. 
Chapter 2 
ADVERTISING, EDITORIA.LIZING, AND FREE EXPRESSION 
ADVERTISING AS AN INSTITUTION 
Advertising need not be . viewed only as the business 
world's tool for mass selling. Such a view would be simp-
listic and only partially correct. Advertising, also can 
be thought of as an institution that assumes an important 
and far reaching role in modern society. Advertising, as 
an institution of social control, .has been compared to 
other major institutions as the Church and the University• 
It is similar to these latter institutions due to its 
extensive influence. It is largely differentiated from 
Church and University because . it is the offspring of modern 
22 
economic abundance. Whereas the Church .meets society's 
spiritual ~needs and the University meets the needs for self-
betterment through reason and learning, advertising satis-
fies people's economic desires and communicates, to them, 
their role-s as consumers. 
Advertising, in .. conjunction with mass media, fulfills 
its so~ial role by affecting attitudes. In the ords of 
Mr. Potter," ••• the only institution which we have for 
22 
Potter, People of Plenty, p. 176. 
15 
16 
instilling new needs, for training people to act as consu-
mers, for altering men•s values, and thus for hastening 
2) 
their adjustment to potential abundance is advertising." 
Furthermo~e, Mr. Leo Bogart, leading advertising strategist, 
concurs with Mr. Potter by saying that, "advertising is 
more than _ an economic forcer it is also a prof.ound in-
fluence on our cUlture, on our values, and on the quality 
24 
of our life." 
Advertising, as an institution, does have a strong 
social effect. It largely reinforces existing social 
25 
attitudes and has the potential for changing attitudes. 
An institution with such influential capabilities as 
modern advertising ean also provide the necessary tool 
for maintaining .free expression. 
ADVERTISING AS COMMUNICATION 
If advertising, . as an institution, reinforces or 
changes social values and attitudes, then it accomplishes 
such effeets by communicating ideas, information, and 
opinions. - Advertising, in a more basic context, is com-
munication, i.e., it "involves the symbolic representation 
23 
Ibid • • p • 1 7 5. 
24 
Leo Bogart, Strategy In Advertising, (New Yorks 
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc,, 1967), p. vii. 
25 
Potter, People of Plenty, p. 188, 
26 
17 
of the context of a thought." More succinctly, advertising 
may be defined as "any paid form of mass media presentation 
and promotion of ideas, goods or services by an identified 
2? 
sender.• The relevant aspect of this definition, for 
purposes of free expr·ession, deals with ideas and not 
goods ·or . ~ervices. 
The entire advertising process also embodies commun-
28 
ication, Briefly, the advertiser (communicator) designs 
(encodes) his advertisement (message) and transmits it 
via media (channels) to his audience (receivers).- ~ho may 
or may not buy (positive response)., .The purpose of these 
. 29 
coded. pre-engi~eered messages is to communicate as pre-
cisely and with as much impact as pos.sible, given a strict-
ly limited amount of space or time. Precision, competition, 
and complexity of process all demand that advertising be 
a form of communication characteri~ed by artistry, scien-
tific knowledge,. and technical skill, 
Advertising, viewed within a communication eontex~. 
assumes a more basic and broader meaning than that attri-
buted it by everyday business world connotations, It is not 
26 
Karl-Erik Warneryd and Kjell Nowak, Mass Communication 
and Advertising, (Stockholm: Economic Research Institute, 
A B Svenska Telegrambyran STB, 1967), p. 12, 
27 
Ibid. ' p. 16. 
28 
Ibid •• pp, 13, 17, 26, 
29 
Toffler, p. 164. 
1·8 
just the clamoring of merchants for people's attention. 
It is an economic and sociai institution based on commun-
ication .Processes. Furthermore, advertising's propinquity 
to business practices can be seen .as a practical asset for 
maintenance of free expression. Its daily use throughout 
this cen~~ has fostered a communicat1on system which . 
need be altered only insofar as the content of the messages 
be changed from selling co.mpany products to insuring that 
citizens • opinions be presented·. 
ADVERTISING AND FREE EXPRESSION 
It has already been suggested that, in order to 
maintain a system of free expression, one would most likely 
have to work with the established systems of mass commun-
ication whose stru~tures are controlled by a minority of 
editors, station managers, and skilled technicians. It has 
also been suggested that, with the rapidity of technological 
advancement, the trend in controlling the mass communica-
tion systems will rely even more heavily on those specia-
lists and ~nagers mentioned above, Furthermore, it has 
been pointed out that, perhaps, the only active institu-
tion existing which can be used to maintain the free ex-
pression system is modern advertising. 
The notion to use advertising to maintain free 
expression, as stated in the introduction, is not new. 
Mr. Co H. Sandage expounded this idea to the Association 
for Education in Journalism in 1958. As already ci ed, 
he too viewed advertising as an institution with its 
major "facet .. being communication. . , In the same speech, 
. . 
Mr. Sandage continued by expanding the idea to use adver-
tisirigt 
True, its communicating function has been con-
fined largely to informing and persuading people in 
respect to products and services. On the other 
hand, it can be madeequally available to those who 
wish . to - inform and persuade people in respect to a 
city bond issue, cleaning up community crime, the · 
'logic' of ath~ism the needs for better educational 
facilities, the abusive tactics of given law enforce-
ment officers, or any other sentiment held by any 
individual who wishes to present such sentiment to 
the public,JO 
This kind of concept seems readily easy to grasp, 
but the fact is that very few people, especially those 
in the various disciplines of mass communication, have 
19 
done little to see that free expression keep pace with 
technological progress. Mr. Sandage also brought atten-
tion to this lack of action. He attacked obsolete methods 
for free speech implementation by sayinga 
Adhe rence to the old concepts of implementing 
free speech can only curtail and largely destroy 
the effective communication of the lay citizen with 
various publics. The ne er concept of using adver-
tising as a communication vehicle for the lay cit-
iz.en can make each purchaser of a t o-inch column 
of space his own editor and publisher. The free-
dom to speak is meaningless unless there is effec-
tive machinery for distributing speech to those 
ears one wishes to reach.31 
Sandage's theme is similar to other sources cited. 
The similarity lies in the fact that many persons in the 
)0 
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31 
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mass communication sys·tems, as well as some in the legal 
institutions, have not yet realized or accepted the fact 
that old methods of free speech do not meet citizens• 
needs in a rapidly advancing, technological age. Modern 
advertising, however, does presently have the capability 
to acc~mplish the task. 
EDITORIAL ADVERTISING 
Advertising, on the institutional level, provides 
a means to work within present systems to maintain free 
expression. Advertising, as communication, implies that 
20 
free expression is available if the opportunity is seized. 
The next step would be to seek a specific tool, the 
exact form of advertising, with which citizens could 
exercise their free expression. This specific type of 
advertising h~s been labeled editorial advertising. 
Editorial advertising has been defined as a spot of time 
or space paid by individuals or groups for the purpose of 
)2 
expressing opinions on issues of public importance. 
For the purpose of semantic clarity,- it will be neces-
sary to dwell further on the definition of editorial 
advertising. This is due to the legal and practical 
questions which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Editorial advertising is differentiated from other 
forms of advertising by two main factors. One difference. 
32 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 11 L. ed. 2nd. 689 
(1964). 
2l 
is the actual content of its· messages • . The other is the 
• I • person o~ group who 1s sponsor1ng the message. For 
example, an ad, .written and paid for by John Public and 
expressing his opinion on local air ·pollut~C?n st.andards, 
would qua.lify as an editorial advertisement. A similar 
ad, writt~n_. and paid for by X Oil · Company, · would not qua-
lify as an editorial advertisement. Because of its poten-
tially commercial benefits to X Oil Company, the latter 
example ould more accurately be labeled as a ~public 
3.3 
relations institutional advertisement." 
Another very similar from of advertisement to editor-
34 
ial advertising is the "public service institutional ad." 
In this type of ad, ideas about an important social pro-
blem are given by an identified company9 "bu~ no effort 
is made to indicate where the firm stands on the problem 
.35 
or what the firm has done about it~" This typ~ of ad 
again differs from editorial advertising b~cause of the 
commercial sponsor. 
A third type of similar advertising not to be con-
fused witrr editorial advertising is the non-commercial . 
JJ 
Barb ra D. Coe, Advertising Practice, (Engle ood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 2. 
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)6 
institutional ad v1hich usually promotes organizations like 
Red Cross, American Cancer Society, Easter Seals,. etc. 
This type of ad is also often referred to as a public ser-
vice announcement. The non-commercial institutional ad 
contrasts from the editorial advertisement in that it 
promotes ~ideas which normally concern civic ventures, by 
soliciting contributions for charitable institutions and 
religious organizations, or issuing information about 
services available from federal, state and local govern-
37 
ment." This type of advertising also varies due to 
the fact that it is run free of charge by the media in-
volved. Because it is free, it is not always guaranteed 
time or space and may be subject to somewhat more editing 
than· ~ paid ad. 
Other categories of advertising types which normally 
show no resemblance to editorial advertising area 
)6 
3? 
1. Commercial Advertising (Business) - this 
involves the selling of products or services 
to middlemen. 
2. Commercial Advertising (Consumer) - this is 
the selling of products and services to the 
ultimate consumer. It is the most common 
form of advertising. 
3. Demand Stimulation Advertising - this is 
designed to stimulate a spe.cific type of 
demand response in the market.)8 
Ibid., p. 3. 
Ibid. 
38 
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These latter categories are obviously all commercially 
oriented and bear no resemblance to the former institutional 
types nich might be confused with editorial advertising. 
Editorial advertising is, as Sandage stated, a ·new 
concept. It may be seen as a spinoff of an old concept 
for free ~~P.ression . - the editorial. Editorial advertising, 
however, is not nearly the same as the editorial. As with 
different types of advertising, a more detailed look at 
the editorial will help create a better distinction between 
it and the new .concept of editorial advertising. 
· Freedom of expression pertaining specifically to 
editorializing can be traced to 1801 hen " ••• President 
Jefferson released from jail those who were still serving 
sentences for such crtmes as printing 'peace and retirement 
to the President (Adams),' and the federal government 
39 
abandoned the field of legislating against its critics." 
In Jefferson's time, editorializing usually implied 
the printing of an o·pinion on a public issue, most often 
political. Today, however, an editorial is either a 
letter written to a newspaper by an individual citizen who 
hopes his opinion will be printed, or it is a column of 
opinion written by an editor· or o~e of his staff. 
Since 1949, editorializing also occurs in the broad-
39 
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. 40 
cast media. This type of editoriali~ing is usually pre-
sented by a· commentator who holds definite opinions on the 
topics discussed, Broadcast editorials differ from those 
in newspapers by one very important fact. They are sub-
41 
ject to the Fairness Doctrine which allows advocates of 
views oppose.d to those ·expressed by the commentator to 
voice their opinion on the air. 
Whether print or broadcast t;nedia, . the use of the edi-
torial today as a means of free expression is severely 
limited, It is limited technically because not every letter 
to the editor can be given space, nor can every advocate of 
a public issue be given time to reply.· The editorial is 
limited politically by the fact that the gatekeeper (editor 
·or station manager) may disagree with a submitted editorial 
to the point that ~is p·ersonal prejudices motivate him to · 
find reason for not printing or broadcasting the submission. 
The .new concept of editorial -advertising combines the 
idea of the editorial with the modern institution of adver-
tising, to give individuals a greater assurance that their 
opinion wi~l be express~d to their community. The assu~ance 
mentioned here is the major difference between edit6rial 
advertising and the editorial. It is simply that the time 
40 
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or space is paid . for. 
Finally, .there is one factor which places editorial 
advertising in a unique category. This factor is its legal 
definition. The actual legal status of editorial adverti-
sing is the subject .of the following chapter, but it is 
important _to note here that editorial advertising is legally 
similar to the editorial while being legally dissimilar to 
commercial adve.rtising. This seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion is best clarified by Justice Brennan who, in the Court~s 
dec~sion on New York Times v. SullivanJ wrote; 
The publication .here was not a commercial adver-
tisement ••• It communicated information, expressed 
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, 
and sought financial support on behalf of a movement 
. whose existence and. ·objectives are matters of the 
highest public -· nterest ····and ·concern... Any other 
conclusion ould discourage newspapers fro m ca rcying 
editorial advertisements of this type, and so might 
shut off an important ·outlet for promulgation of 
information and ideas by . persons who do not them-
selves have access to publishing facilities - who 
wis·h to exercise their freedom of speech even 
though t~ey are not members of the press.42 
SUMMARY 
The focus of this chapter has been on advertising as 
a general means to maintain a free expression system. 
As the previous chapter attempted to point out, the 
most effective way to maintain free expression is to utilize 
the present institutions. This chapter has attempted to 
42 
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show that modern advertising is considered to be an insti-
tution holding significant economic and social .influence, 
This influence and advertising•·s communicative nature were 
shown to provide a contemporary avenue for maintaining free 
expression. 
This - chapter also considered a spec.ific tool by which 
free expression can be maintained, This tool wa·s labeled 
editorial advertising An attempt was ·also made to show 
how the new coneept of editorial advertising differed from 
other forms of advertising which appear to be quite similar, 
except that they are either commercially sponsored or not 
paid for at all. 
This chapter also focused on the difference between 
editorial advertising and present day editorial6 The 
major difference being that the former is paid for while 
the latter is note One last characteristic difference was 
also shown to be a legal de.finition. Editorial advertising, 
was shown t~ have the same Constitutional rights as other 
forms of editorializing. 
Chapter J 
EDITORIAL ADVERTISINGs PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STATUS 
The first chapter reported on the background of the 
First Amendment, giving specific attention to the origin 
and meaning. The second chapter sheds light on a contem-
porary method for maintaining the free expression system 
through the modern institution of advertising and the 
specific tool, editorial advertising. 
This chapter examines the basic philosophy upon which 
editorial advertising, as a means of ~ree expression, rests. 
This philosophy in~olves the right of access to the media, 
both print and broadcast. 
This chapter also looks at examples of editorial 
advertising in various media to show its everyday manifes-
tations. Some of the examples have not, as of this inves-
tigation, been published or broadcast, but plans to do so 
have been reported by reliable sources. Other examples 
of editorial advertising stem from the ·legal cases revie ed. 
This chapter finally focuses on those legal cases 
I 
directly involving editorial advertising and those cases 
which serve as primary precedents. Detailed attention is 
given to all judicial decisions regarding editorial adver-
tising and the First Amendment. 
27 
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ACCESS TO THE MEDIA 
Maintenance of free expression depends on the co-
operation of the modern mass communication systems including 
ne spapers, radio and television networks, and other media 
such as magazines, outdoor advertising companies, and 
transportation companies which sell space for advertising 
purposes. The general public would find it extremely dif-
ficult to communicate with one another if were not for the 
cooperation of these media, 
Most of these systems are re·gulated either governmen-
tally or internally. But ·the agencies and associations 
that have been responsible for such regulation cannot 
guarantee that free expression be a reality for all citizens. 
Because of this practical deficiency there has been 
a recent trend among constitutional experts and communi 
cation speciali~ts for a right of access to the media by 
individuals or groups seeking to express their opinions 
on issues of public importance. 
This right of access philosophy can be seen to have 
stemmed from the fact that many of the mass media have not 
cooperated, for various reasons, with those ho want to 
voice an opinion. The lack of cooperation by the media, 
in turn, has emanated from its current business nature. 
Unlike the 1700's, free speech and free press have not 
recently been regarded as synonymous among a number of 
media managers, Instead, many media people now equate 
29 
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the free pres~ concept with laissez-faire economicsa i.e., 
some people of the print and broadcast ·press have styled 
First Amendment interpretations to fit their business needs, 
Their claim of "free press" really means "do not interfere 
with our business" and serves to stifle others .whose "free 
speech" rel1e_s_ on media access. 
A leading proponent of a right of access to the media, 
Jerome- Barron, discussed today•s First Amendment paradox 
implied by the conflict between individual free speech 
and freedom of the press, _ He stated& 
To them (those hose ideas are .unacceptable 
to editors) the mass communication industry replies: 
The First Amendment guarantees our freedom to do as 
we choose with our media. Thus the constitutional 
imperative of free expression becomes a rationale for 
repressing ~ compe-ting ideas ,44 
In addition, further inconsistencies in the practical 
application of the First Amendment have pointed to the need 
for a modern interpretation that considers the question of 
media access. Barron comme.nted s 
While we have taken measures to ensure the 
sanctity· of that which is saido e have not 
inquired whether, as a practical matter, the 
difficulty of acce.ss to the media of communica-
tion has made the right of expression somewhat 
mythical.45 
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Arguments opposing a right of access have relied on 
the logic that other media exist hi~h might offer outl•ts 
for expression. Arguments proposing further access, how-· 
ever, have countered by saying that access relies "not so 
much in an abundance of alternative media, but in an abun-
dance of opportunities to secure expression in media.with 
. -·--- 46 
the largest impact." This same reasoning was found in 
a pair of lega~ decisions concerning the extent of free 
expression, "Restraints on freedom of speech are not 
justified simply because alternative forms of expression 
47 
are available." "As long as the medium sought is an 
appropriate one, the availability of other media is irre-
48 
levant. •• 
Another reason favoring the need for a right of access 
is the abridgement · of expression by private enterprise, 
an area traditionally not covered by the First Amendment. 
Proponents have stated that a new interpretation is needed 
Nwhich focuses on the idea that restraining the hand of 
government is quite useless ••• if a restraint on- free speech 
. 49 
is effectively secured by private groups." Indeed, 
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because mass media systems are basically profit oriented 
and because they are trying to reach and please as large 
an audience as possible, presentation of controversial 
opinions have become ·impractical. Therefore, proponents 
have maintained that · the old constitutional interpretation 
"is unrealistic if it prevents courts or legislatures from 
requiring the media to do that which, for commercial rea-
50 
sons, they would be otherwise unlikely to do." 
Opponents to further access include Mr. c. Daniel who 
has purported the traditional argument that problems of 
free expression should be kept witnin the media themselves. 
He statedt 
I am perfectly prepared to concede that there is 
a pro·blem ~of access to the press in this country. 
My contention is that the remedies should be left 
largely to the press itself and the reading public.51 
Although Daniel disagrees ith Barron as to the means 
by which access should be obtained, he nevertheless admits 
that there is a problem and the immediate future will 
warrant solutions. The major disparity in viewpoints is 
that Daniel thinks that ulegislators and judges should not 
52 
be the ones to decide how much access there should be.• 
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·· Barron essentially has proposed that .there sh.ould be 
a new First Amendment interpretation that would include 
access to the media as a basic right of free expression. 
This extended right could not be abridged by government 
and should not be allowed to be abridged by private enter-
prise. 
Daniel, on the other hand, has proposed that the ques-
tion of access should be considered by . the media and that 
judicial and legislative institutions should only suggest 
and not force access rights. 
Print Media Access 
Access to the print media has been thoroughly dis-
cussed by William Douberley who generally agrees with 
Barron's proposal and who offers editorial advertising as 
53 
an alternative vehicle. 
Douberley contends that changes in mass communication 
over the past two centuries have created a situation, 
regaroing the press as a vehicle for · free . expression, which 
has largely contradicted the First Amendment. He has 
stated that& 
speech is not necessarily 'free' in the press. 
Since it forms the center of the process of dis-
semination of ide~s, the press is the force that 
can most effectively abridge expression by nulli-
53 
William Douberley, "Resolving The Free Speech - Free 
Press Dichotomy s Access To The Press Through Advertising," 
University of Florida Law Review., XXII (1969), p. 293. 
fying the opportunity for an idea to obtain public 
exposure.54 
He went further into this dichotomy by w:ritinga 
the first amendment's frustration by a system 
that· was thought ·to embody its goals is paradoxical. 
The press was given constitutional protection because 
it was thought to be the key to free expression. 
33 
The Courts have embraced this concept in upholding 
editorial freedom and taking care to prevent the press 
from falling under state control by means of a public 
utility classification •• ,under present interpreta-
tions, free press inhibits free speech.55 
Douberley ·continued by stating, much like Barron, 
that the reasons for this existing dichotomy were the ·Cen-
tralization and monopolizing of modern newspapers. Such 
a situation has demanded that business considerations take 
' 
precedence over expression considerations· and thus has 
given rise to non-controversial advertising and editorials 
that only support popular attitudes. 
This inv~st igator has also found evidence that the 
trend toward monopoly stifling competition . in the mass 
media, not to mention free expression, has been an ever-
present problem. The most recent example was reported in 
the Orlando Sentinel Star The article described action 
by the Justice Department stating: 
(It was) opposing continued operation by news-
paper o\-vners. of tele·visioil and radio s'ations in St. 
Louis, I~issouri and DesMoines,. Iowa ••• The department 
said rene al of broadcasting licenses ••• ·ould not be 
in the public interest because the publishers were 
effectively hindering competiti~on in the dissemina-
55 
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tion of news and advertising.56 
The growing trend toward news monopoly lends some 
support to earlier evidence tha~ those who control mass 
media are few and that their control has increased,. For 
these reasons access to the press has assumed greater rele-
v·ance · especially when considering the maintenance of a 
free expression system. 
The trend toward press monopoly, along with other rea-
sons, has fostered a parallel trend toward press access, 
particularly involving the use of advertising. In Zucker 
y. Panitz, a case involving the use of advertising as an 
access vehicle in a school newspaper, it was found that the 
advertiser had a right to publish an antiwar advertisement 
in the paper. The advertisement had been refused by the 
school principal on the ground that it was not related to 
school activities, but the court stated that "the princi-
pal could not preclude the students from expressing their 
57 ' 
views." 
Writing on the judicial enforcement of a right of 
access by means of advertising, Barron stateda 
In Uhlman Ve Sherman (22 Ohio N.P. 225) an Ohio 
lo er court held that the dependence and interest 
of the public in the community newspaper, particu-
larly when it is the only one, imposes the reasonable 
demand that the purchase of advertising should be 
56 
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open to members of the public an the same basis. 
Edi~orial advertising, as already suggested, has been 
a primary contender for supplying access to the press. · 
Researching its possible use in print media, Douberley 
has writt~ns . 
An_ application of ~he first amendme·nt to free 
speech type advertisements could provide an equally 
effective means of access to the press, Advertorials 
have been found to be an effective and relatively 
inexpensive way to express ideas not recognized as 
worthy of comment by editors. McCluhan has observed 
that editorials are ignored unless put in the form 
of news or advertising. This indicates that the 
advertorial may be even more desirable as a means of 
expression than the publisher•s own format, the 
editorial, since readers give at least equal attention 
to news copy and to advertisements.59 
One final advantage for using editorial advertising as an 
access vehicle to the printed pres·s, has been found · to be 
that its sale not only provides the advertiser with a forum 
for expressing himself, but it also provides a "propor-
60 
tional amount of editorial space,n Profit would be 
realized by monetary gain as well as the opportunity for 
the editor, or anyone opposed to the advertisement, to 
print countervailing arguments enhancing free expression 
dialogue. 
Broadcast Media Access 
The general trend for media access is some hat more 
58 
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complicated in the .broadcast industry than in the printed 
. I 
press. Such complic· t ions have arisen over conflicts 
61 . 62 
between the Communication Act, the Fairness Doctrine 
and the First Amendment. 
Section 315 of the Communication Act specifically 
l 
provides access for political candidates, giving equal 
opp·ortunities to all public office seekers. What has · been 
commonly referred to as the "equal time" clause is appli-
cable only if a licensee provides time to any one candidate. 
Only then has the licensee been required tq ·offer the same 
opportunities to opposing hopefuls. Furthermore, Se.ct ion 
315 excludes newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, 
and on-the-spot news covet-age from the realm Vlhich "equal 
• r 
time« can apply. Section 315 also does not include adver-
tising for political candidates as that which requires 
equal opportunities. 
· The Fairness DOctrine stemmed from the Federal Com-
munication Commission's investiga~ion of editorializing 
by broadcast licensees, It states that persons or groups 
holding views on issues of public importance that conflict 
,.,ith those espoused by a licensee's commentary shall have 
reasonable opportunity to reply. 
A major criticism of the Fairness Doctrine, in 
61 
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terms of free expression and access, has been that many 
licensees simply avoid broadcasting commentaries on con-
63 . ' 
J7 
troversial issues. Rather than comply with the fairness 
provisions and seek viewpoints opposing their commentaries, 
broadcas~ers do not comment ·at all or comment on noncontro-
versial ma.tt.ers. 
Opponents of further broadcast access· through First 
Amendment interpretations have suggested that Section 315 
and the Fairness Doctrine are sufficient to satisfy t~e · 
64 
constitutional requirements. Proponents, on the other 
hand, have suggested that nei~her the "equal time• clause 
nor the Fairness Doctrine supply individuals with an 
·opportunity to initiate expression; i.e., individuals or 
groups must .wait until a licensee has commented on a con-
troversial issue, or given time to a ·candidate, before 
65 
they even attempt to rebut. 
The specific purpose of Section 315 has not compar-
atively elicited much argument by access advocates or 
opponents. The Fairness Doctrine. however, has been cited 
66 
by both camps in support of their arguments. 
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The right of access to broadcast media was strongly 
. . . . 67 
supporte~ in Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v, F,C,C, The 
case involved a perceiv~d conflict between the First Amend-
. . 
ment and the Fairness Doctrine. Specifically, broadcasters 
argued that the Fairness Doctrine abr1dged their consti-
tutional ~ights. The Court, however, stateds 
It is the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political. esthetic, moral, and other 
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That 
right may not be constitutionally abridged either by 
Congress or by the F,C,C.68 
Not only did the Court define the public's right of 
access, but also the obligations of broadcast licensees: 
There is nothing in the First Amendment which 
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee 
to share his frequency with others and to conduct 
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations 
to present those views and voices which are repre-
sentative of his community and which ould other-
wise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.69 
Jaffe revie' ed the Red Lion decision regarding the 
dual issues of access and .fairness and wrote& 
The Court held that the fairness doctrine, and · 
even a right to command time, is not only tolerated 
by the first amendment but is required by it. · 'It 
is the right of the vie ers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters which is paramount ••• • 
·we must therefore conclude on the basis of the 
pronouncements in Red Lion that the fairness 
doctrine is in a somewhat loose sense a first 
67 
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amendment requirement.70 
Access to broadcast media via. advertising has gen-
erally been regarded similar to· other attempts of securing 
access. Advertising.·. however. adds a dimension which has 
made it somewhat more practical. It produces revenue for 
the licens~~· -· Editorial advertising specifically has 
been offered as a means by which individuals could gain 
access and broadcasters could gain money. 
Broadcasters, however, have opposed this specific 
use of editorial advertising for fear that groups or indi-
viduals opposed to a particular advertisement may demand 
free time to reply on the basis of the Fairness Doctrine 
71 
as defined in Red· Lion·. 
Jaffe commented on t~t argument by writing. "If adver-
torials engender fairness obligations, the number the broad-
caster is required to take must be limited by some quota, 
72 
perhaps graded to his profit level." Furthermore, as 
will be seen in the legal review, there have been decisions 
hich do not regard editorial advertising as "engendering" · 
?J 
Fairness Doctrine obligations. 
Finally, nothing has been stated in the Fairness 
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Doctrine which specifically pertains to editorial advertising. 
The closest statement to required access has been found in 
Section 315, but as stated that applies only to political 
candidates, And even if broadcasters had attempted to apply 
that Section to editorial advertisements, the only thing 
they would be required to do is to give opponents to a 
. - ·- -· 
particular advertisement art equal opportunity to buy time 
for their own advertisement • . 
Access To Other Media 
Access to media othe.r than newspapers, radio, and 
television and for the expression. of opinion has been found 
t be 1 ss controversial. The other media include community 
-antenna television (CATV) and public transportation facili-
ties; e.g., buslines, subways, taxio b companies, etc. 
Access to CATV ·hae been spelled out by specific regula-
tion under authority of the Federal Communication Commission. 
In this regulation the Commission has stateda 
cable systems in major television markets shall 
maintain at least one specially designated, non-
commercial public access channel available on a first-
come, nondiscriminatory basis. · The system shall 
maintain and have available for public use at 
least the minimal equipment and facilities necessary 
for the production and pro.gramming for such 
channel.74 
Access to public transportation facilities has been 
exclusively through the purchasing of advertising space 
on such facilities. Access to these facilities, as out-
74 
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lined in the legal review, ha·s been recognized due to their 
common carrier status. 
The philo·sophy of a right of access to mass media, 
as ari extension of the First Amend~ent, has achieved some 
recognition as a valid interpretation for contemporary 
free expre~~~Qn~. This philosophy has also been opposed, 
particularly by those in .the broadcast media, on grounds . 
that its manifestations would impinge ~on the parallel 
rights of the press, · both print and broadcast. 
This philosophy, ~~hile being controversial, has, 
nevertheless, helped establish percedent for more practical 
means of gaining access while maintaining both individual 
rights of expression and press freedoms. Specifically, 
editorial advertising has been suggested as a vehicle which 
could eliminate the present paradox of conflicting First 
Amendment rights. 
MANIFESTATIONS OF EDITORIAL ADVERTISING 
Print Media 
One of the primary examples of editorial advertising 
found in print media and one of the most notorious was 
printed in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. The 
advertisement was headlined "Heed Their Rising Voices" and 
75 
accused Alabama officials of mistreating Negroes. It 
listed, by lengthy copy, a number of grievances and urged 
75 
See Appendix for complete ad. 
readers to support its cause. 
This example was an expression of opinion by a group 
known as "Committee To Defend Martin Luther King And The 
Struggle For Freedom In The South." It also involved a 
controversiat issue, racial discrimination. · It was 
accepted by -the Times and paid by the Committee which was 
the identified sponsor. 
42 
A second e~a~ple was reported to have been printed in 
76 
the December 15, 196) New York Times. This advertise-
ment was entitled MThe Time Has Come" and was sponsored 
by the John Birch Society. It was a full page, paid 
espousal of that organizations beliefs. 
The most recent example of editorial advertising in 
newspapers was published in the Times on October 14, 1973. 
The headline read, · "Why it is necessary to impeach President 
! 
Nixon. And how it can be done. •• The copy, like that of 
the first example, was a long dissertation listing specific 
grievances as reasons for the action suggested by the 
headline. This advertisement also urged readers to 
support the opinion of the sponsors and the sponsors 
themselves. The American Civil Liberties Union was respon-
77 
sible for the creation and funding. 
76 
Editorial, The New York Times, December 20, 1963, 
p. 28, Col, 2. 
77 
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Broadcast Media · 
Examples of editorial advertising in broadcast media 
have been difficult to locate. There has, however, been 
4) 
one distinct case of national notoriety. The advertisement 
in this example was never broadcast, but it was prepared for 
broadcasting .- b·y a responsib~e organization that was willing 
to pay for all time required. 
The organization was known as Business Executives Move 
for .Vietnam Peace and had prepared a series of sixty second 
spot announcements "urging immediate withdrawal of American 
forces from Vietnam and from othe.r .overseas military 
. 78 
installations ... 
In addition to the sixty second spots, there ·were also 
ten, twenty, and thirty second announcements. The contents 
of these "commercials" varied. The opinion that the rela-
tive loss of life due to immediate withdrawal would be far 
less than that incurred by continuous policies expressed 
a criticism of specific administrative action. Also 
expressed within the advertisements, were the opinions that 
the War was "morally corrupt, politically . inept~ and 
militarily stupid:" that the War was causing domestic 
upheaval; that our "allies" were not representative of their 
population: Vietnamization would only "prolong" the c.on-
flict; that saving lives was more important than •saving 
face; • that .our presence in the conflict was humiliating: 
"withdrawal must be total;" that some arguments for con-
78 25 F.c.c. 2d., p. 242. 
tinued cofl\flict were steeped · in "ps.eudo-patriotism"t and 
. 79 
that the entire foreign policy should be reformed, 
Another example found in broadcast media was reported 
by Advertising ~. At the time of the report the adver-
tisement had not been aired, but plans for an entire cam-
paign had alre·ady been completed. These ads were to be 
broadcast in Canada urging the support of a particular 
religio·us belief. The article stated: . 
Pope Paul VI will be heard on 18 French-
language radio stations throughout the Quebec 
province on october 18, 19 and 20 in 6o· s.econd 
(paid) spots for the local office of the Church·' s 
Propagation of the Faith. The Pope is ·being 
used 'in order to put the weight of .the ~apacy 
behind renewed efforts by the office• to promote 
·Catholicism and ask people ~o work actively for 
the betterment of human condi~i6ns in general. 80 
Other Media 
Other media in which editorial advertisements have 
been manifested were outdoor or public transportation 
vehicles which provide advertising space. Two specific 
examples were found. Legal cases resulted in both 
instances, but after decisions were rendered 0 the advertise-
ments were placed. 
The first example was found in September of 1964, 
An organization known as Women for Peace :created and 
79 
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Advertising ~~. "Pope Paul in Radio Ads for Quebec 
Group,", October 15, 1973. p. 2, 
sponsored an advertisement urging an end to the Vietnam 
War. The message read as follows& 
'Mankind must put an end. to war 
or war will put ~n end to mankind.' 
President John F. Kennedy 
Write to President Johnson• Negotiate Vietnam. 
Women for Peace 81 
.p. o. Box 944, Berkeley, 
This advertisement had been planned for placement on 
the buses operated by the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit 
District. 
The second example was of a similar nature. It was 
sponsored by Students for a Democratic Society. · It was 
created by an advertising agency and · scheduled to show on 
New York subways. The mes·sage read: 
WHY ARE WE BURNING, TORTURING, KILLING 
THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM? TO PREVENT 
FREE ELECTIONS. 
PROTEST this anti-democratic war. 
WRITE President Lyndon Johnson, The White House, . 
Washington D.C. 
GET THE STRAIGHT FACTS, · WRITE 
Students for a Democratic Society 
119 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003 82 
This 10-year old girl was burned by napalm bombs. 
LEGAL STATUS OF EDITORIAL ADVERTISINGa 
REVIEW OF CASES 
The use of editorial advertising has been sparse 
in comparison with commercial advertising. Reasons for 
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its lack of use include unawareness of its potential by 
the ·general public and opposition from those who control 
various media. 
Some of the examples in the previous section were 
opposed by the media for business reasons. That opposition 
lead to lega±~attles which have formed the basic prece-
dents for editorial advertising in general. 
If editorial advertising is to be used further in . 
order to maintain free expression, then a review of all 
relevant legal decisions is imperative. 
Print Media 
The main precedent for editorial advert.ising in print 
. 83 
was established in New York Time§ Company v. Sull.ivan. 
The facts of the case were as follows. 
A New York advertising agency was paid by the "Com-
mittee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for 
Freedom in the South" to create an advertisement (see 
previous section) which listed actions by the Montgomery, 
Alabama Police Department as grievances .. The ad went into 
great detail to explain why readers should support the 
Committee, Dr. King, and the civil rights movement in 
general. As a result of the advertisement, Montgomery 
City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan brought suit for libel 
against those persons listed in the message and against 
83 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 111 ed. 
2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964). 
the New York Times, · An Alabama Court awarded Sullivan 
$500,000.00 in damages • . The case was ~ppealed and the 
Alabama .Supreme Court up~eld the decision. The adver-
tisers and the Times then appealed tb the United .States 
Supreme Court. The Court, in a unanimous decision§ rever-
sed the Alabama Courts and held that the Alabama law was 
"constituti_onally deficient" regarding First Amen~ment 
protections and "evidence presented was constit~tionally· 
. 84 
insufficient.. " 
The maj,ority of arguments presented. to the Court cen-
tered on the issue of libel and free expression. One 
section of the decision did focus on editorial advertising 
_within this cont~xt .of pr~tected spee~h. The Court. stated' 
Where an allegedly libelous· statement appeared 
in a newspaper advertisement Which communicated . 
information, expressed opinion~ recited grievances, 
protested claimed abuses of Negro students protesting 
against segregation, and sought financial support 
on behalf of the movement against racial discrimin-
ation, the allegedly libelous statement did not for-
feit its protection under the constitutional guaranty 
of freedom of sp~ech · and press merely because the 
newspaper was paid for publishing the advertise-
ment.,,any other conclusion,.ewould thus have the 
effect of shackling the First A·mendment in its 
attempt to secure the widest possible dissemination 
of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources,85 
This statement by the Supreme Court, in conjunction 
86 
with the statement on page 25 of this report, clearly 
84
rbid, 
8511 L ed 2d 698 (1964). 
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defined the legal status of editorial advertising as another 
form for free expression within the print media. 
Broadcast Media 
Legal op~nions on the status of editorial advertising 
in broadcast media have been diverse and contrary. It was 
necessary, · for this reason, to review each case more closely 
and to .consider all opinions, concurring and dissenting. · 
Initial Cases. The specific issue of using editorial 
advertisements in these media first arose when Business 
Executives• Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a complaint, 
with the Federal Communications Commission 0 against radio 
station WTOP AM (Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, 
87 
Inc.) The complaint was the result of repeated refusals 
-
by WTOP to accept the editorial advertisements of BEM. 
BEM, on three separate occasions: June 1969, July 
1969, and January 1970, attempted to purchase advertising 
time from WTOP .in order to persuade public opinion against 
88 
Vietnam policy. WTOP refused all attempts· and on 
January 22 1970, BEM filed its complaint alleging that the 
station's actions violated the Fairness Doctrine; infringed 
on the public's right to hear contrasting views; 
and violated the First Amendment by suppressing free 
87 
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speech, BEM further asked the Commission to force WTOP 
89 
to accept their advertisements. 
WTOP responded to the complaint by first stating that 
it had refused the advertisements because they antagonized 
its policy of not accepting controversial matter. They 
furthe·r sta~~~- that they had acted within all rules, regu-
lations, and guidelines established by ·the Commission and 
90 
the National Association of B.roadcasters. 
The Commission, af~er hearing both arguments, cata-
gorized its decision according to the allegations made in 
I 
the complaint. The first catego~y .in its decision regarded 
the Fairness Doctrine violations. The Commission agreed 
with BEM that the Vietnam War was, indeed, a controversial 
issue. In their opinion, however, they found ~ffOP's 
news coverage and programming to be sufficient to satisfy 
Fairness Doctrine requirements. The Commission, thus, 
dismissed the complaint on that particular allegatio_n. 
The second category of the complaint, regarding the 
public's right to hear controversial issues was attended to 
more quickly than the first. BEM's argument in support of 
this allegation rested on an earlier Supreme Court decision 
in the case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Y•· . F.C.~. which 
stated the "right of the public to receive suitable access 
89 
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90 
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to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas." 
The Commission dismissed this ·allegation by stating, "Inas~ 
much as WTOP appears to have presented •representative· . 
community views• on the issues here in question, we find 
that it has not acted contrary to the principles laid · 
92 
down in Red ~Lion ... 
The third category of the complaint, alleging sup-
pression of free expression, was also based on the Red Lion 
decision and it t ·oo was subsequently dismissed by the 
Commission. With all t~ree cat~gories of BEM'·s complaint 
dismissed as being either too general or .. misinterpretive. 
of earlier decisions, the Commission denied BEM's request 
to have its advertisements broadcast. · 
There was, however, one . dissenting opinion, that of 
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson who wrote an extensive, 
detailed criticism of the Commission's decision. Mr. 
Johnson held the opi~ion that the main issue of the hearing 
had been overlooked. 
The issue, therefore, is not what policy 
the Commission might wish to adopt concerning 
the •advertisements' b fore us, but what the 93 
· Constitution requires the Commission to adopt. 
He continued his reasoning by stating that the Commission 
had ignored "a long line of judicial precedent which 
guarantees •• oa right of access to forums generally open 
91 . . 
Cf • supra, P• 38. 
92 
25 F.c.c. 2d, p. 243. 
93 
Ibid., p. 250. 
.. 
51 
94 
to the public for expression of views. •• Mr. Johnson then 
stated what he believed to be the four main issues of 
the case. The first one, considering the protection of 
advertising as free speech, was relevant to this review. 
· Mr. Johnson listed some of the forementioned prece-
dents regarding advertising and free speech and then 
stateds 
Although the distinction drawn is an elusive one, 
it divides, perhaps, speech which seeks to influence · 
political and social decisions in the marketplace 
of id~as from speech which seeks to influence pri-
vate economic decisions in the marketplace of goods 
and services.95 
He concluded his comments on this issue by suggesting 
that WTOP and the Commission had "relegated political and 
social speech to an inferior role .. by preferring commer-
1 96 
cial advertising to editorial advertising. He contra-
dieted the Commission's decision by stating, "BEM's anti-
war advertisements are 'speech' deserving of First Amend-
97 
ment protect ion." 
' 
A related case, also involving the purchase of time 
for expression of opinion, was organized by the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC), The DNC had attempted to purchase 
network television time in order to present an issue-oriented 
94Ibid,, p. 251. 
9 5 Ibid • , p • 2 52 • 
96 
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program designed to comment on controversial issues and also 
98 
designed to solicit funds. 
The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) ·rejected the 
request for time on the grounds that no elections were in 
progress. The National Broadcasting Company (NBC), however 
did grant p~c~ · request for time. The American Broadcasting 
Company (ABC) refused to sell their time on the grounds of 
its general policy prohibiting monetary appeal for pur-
. 99 
poses other than charitable. 
On May 19, 1970, the DNC filed a request with the 
Federal Communications Commission that general policies of 
the television networks, regarding the sale of time for 
expression of opinion, be made nationally uniform in order 
to facilitate campaign and media planning. The DNC speci-
fically sought a d.eclarat ion that "'A broadcaster may not, 
as a general policy, refuse to sell time . to responsible 
entities, such as DNC, for the solicitation of funds and 
100 
for comment on public issues. '" 
The DNC, like BEM, based its arguments on the Red Lion 
decision which, according to the DNC, nreaffirmed the 
public's First Amendment right to hear contrasting views 
98 
Democratic National Committee, Federal Communications 
Commission Reports, 25 F.c.c. 2d, 1970, p. 216. 
99 
Ibid • • p. 21 7 • 
100 
Ibid • , p • 216 • 
53 
on issues of public importance and 'employed language that 
would extend to members of the public the right of access 
101 
to broadcast facilities.' .. .. 
The DNC qualified their argument by suggesting that 
such access be regulated by the Commission and be given to 
responsible _gt'Qups. The DNC also pointed out that· it was 
not seeking to require acceptance of any particular pro-
gram, but only that arbitrary barriers to access are con-
102 
trary to the public interest. 
ABC, ·in response to the DNC•s request before the 
Commission, altered its position • . It stated that, in 
the final analysis, the DNC was attempting to fortify a 
two party system and therefore its request fit into ABC's 
103 
category of "special public interest consideration." 
CBS. ·however, maintained its refusal and counter-
argued by stating that its policies& 
insure full and fair presentation of such issues; 
that a regulatory policy which imposes common carrier 
obligations would be contrary to the public interest: 
there was no constitutional or statutory right to 
compel broadcasters to carry the DNC programs and: 
such obligation would be contrary to the Communications 
Act and Commission precedent.104 
CBS proceeded to justify its claims by suggesting that 
101 
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implementat~on of such requests . woUld "radically alter the 
nature of broadcasting and be a detriment . to fair, objective 
and balanced information to the listening public ·." CBS 
. . 
also suggested that selling t .ime for . pub~ic issues would 
preempt the "limited bro-adcast frequencies and allo those 
rich groups · to- distort issues." ~hey finally stated "The 
First Amendment is primarily co·ncerned with the right of 
the public . to be ·inform d .. as o·pposed to the right of the 
. .. 10:5 
public to speak or to be heard." 
The .Gommission, in the course of its decision, 
analyzed both the DNC and CBS .arguments. The Commission 
concluded that CBS' argument rested on the "assertion that 
no particular group or person has .the right to spea k over 
106 . 
broadcast facilities." T·hey continued their analysis 
of charges and countercharges and separated their final 
decision into two parts. Part one regarded the right of 
political parties to purchase time for solicitation. Part 
two regard.ed the right of responsible entities to buy time 
for opinion expression. The Commission passed judgment on 
part two first. 
The Commission's decision on part two of the DNC 
request began by emphasizing that such a requests 
goes to the heart of the ·system of broadcasting 
which has developed in this country; i.e., the 
licensing of private entities under the public 
interest standard. While the issues raised by ·the 
DNC are fundamental, they are not open. They 
105 
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have long been settled adversely to the DNC posi-
tion ••• 107 
The Commissioh also stated that due to the Unique 
. 55 
nature of broadcast frequencies, "some who wish to use it 
. 108 
must be denied." They continued in that vein by citing 
the Red Lion decision as supporting the view that nobody 
has the right to access. They also were finally careful 
to point out that there was no specific policy which actually 
prohibited the sale of time on public issues. "Licensees 
are free to do so, with the caveat that the fairness 
109 
doctrine ••• must be observed." 
The Commission's decision in part one, regarding fund 
raising, basically concurred with the new position taken 
by ABC; i.e., ~hey found purchasing time for solicitation 
to be acceptable because-it was ultimately in the public 
interest. 
The Commission, in conclusion, stated, "In view of the 
foregoing, the re·quest of the DNC and ABC for a declara-
' tory ruling IS GRANTED, to the extent reflected in part 
110 
II and all other respects, IS DENIED." What · .was ·· .concluded, in 
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. . 
essence, was that certain paid ~nn~unc~ments asking for 
money were acceptable, but those commenting on controversial 
issues were not. 
The major implications, derived from the BEM and the 
DNC hearings. before the .Federal Communications .Commission, 
were that e4ito-rial advertisements cannot be forced upon 
broadcasters; advertising time and program time were con-
sidered synonymous: advertis·ements for political financial 
solicitation were acceptable provided that there were no 
controversial issues contained ithin them; licensees 
may acc.ept editorial advertisements if they choose, being 
cognizant that fairness implications might ariser and it 
is the judgment of the licensee that is paramount in defi-
ning .. controversial issues of public importance," 
Appellate Cases. On March 9, 1971, both BEM and the 
DNC appealed the decision of the Communications Commission 
· to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, which generally hears appeals of .this nature. 
The petitioners (BEM and the DNC) argued that the 
Commission's decision in the previous hearings tacitly 
permitted a general broadcaster policy of banning all con-
111 
troversial editorial advertising from the air. 
The Circuit Court reversed the Commission's decision 
and remanded the cases for furthe~ study. The reasons for 
the reversal applied specifically to editorial advertising 
as b-eing protected by the First Amendment. They also dif-
ferentiated between advertising ime and general program-
57 
ming time, The Commission's decisions were largely based . 
on Fairness .Doctrine interpretations as applied to general 
programming, 
The Court's reasoning began by referring to that 
differentiation. 
The . principle at.stake here ••• concerns the 
people's right to engage in and to. hear vigorous 
public debate on broadcast media. More spe9ifi-
cally, it concerns the application of that right 
to the substant.ial portion of the broadcast day 
which is sold for advertising ••• For too long 
advertising has been considered a virtual free 
fire zone, largely ungoverned by regulatory 
guidelines ••• ll2 
. The Court continued its disagreement, referring to 
the Commission's argument that acceptance of editorial 
advertising would strike at the "heart" of the broadcasting 
system a~d cause chaos, The Court pointed out that the 
issue was specific .and not one of radical change. The. 
Court reassured the Commission and broadcasters by stating& 
· ••• we leave undisturbed the licensee's basic right 
to exercise judgment and control in public issue 
programming and the sale of ·advertising time. All we 
do forbid is an extreme form of control which totally 
excludes public debate from broadcast advertising 
time .113 
In essence, the Court was directing its decision 
against a flat ban on editorial advertising. It further 
suggested that the Commission develop "reasonable regula-
tions," as quickly as possible, that would determine which 
112 
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114 
and how many editorial advertisements would be broadcast. 
The Court, in support of its reasoning, .stressed First 
Amendment interpretations more and Fairness Doctrine 
applications less. The Court, like BEM, the DNC, and the 
Commission, _ ~~~ed the Red Lion case, adding its interpre-
tation. They quoted the Supreme Court's decision by saying, 
"the people as a whole retain their collective right to 
have the medium function consistently with the ends and 
115 
purpose of the First Amendment." 
The Circuit Court also held .a technical view of the 
broadcast media but added that the media was "our foremost 
forum for public speech" and by its very nature "plays an 
absolutely crucial role in the process of s·elf-governnlent 
116 
and free expression." 
The Court continued its categorical disagreement with 
related aspects of the co·mmission 's standpoint. The Com-
mission purported that the Fairness Doctrine was sufficient 
to observe First Amendment rights, but the Court stated 
that, due to the special nature of advertising, the Com-
mission should reconsider, The essence of that remanding 
was twofold. First, 
when an individual or group buys time to say 
114 
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116 
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its piece, the crucial controls are in its own 
hands. Editorial advertising is thus a special 
and separate mode of expression, ·not simply a 
duplication of other expression on the same 
medium.117 
59 
Second, the Court stated that the use of editorial adver-
tising allowed groups and individuals to actively express 
118 
themselves;_ .i.-e. • "to take the initiative," This 
reasoning was furthered by invoking the First Amendment 
idea of free and vigorous debate coupled with the tradi-
tional idea that the best judge of expressing an opinion 
is the person or group who holds that opinion. 
The Court criticized the Commission on this point by 
The present system, allowing a flat ban on . 
ed·i to rial advertising, -conforrns instead to a 
paternalistic structure in which licensees and 
bureaucrats decide what issues are 'important• 
h·ow 'full~,-' to· cover them and the format, time 
and style of coverage.119 
The Court then concluded its discussion on Fairness Doc-
trine sufficiency by stating that it did not "eliminate the 
public's interest in a further, complementary airing of 
120 
controversial views ·during advertising time," 
The Circuit Court also touched on the issue of access 
citing five cases as precedent, These included Wirta Y.•. 
117 
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121 
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District . and Kissinger v·. 
122 
New York City Transit Authority. The main argument 
taken from both of those ca.ses was that of previously opened 
forum. The Court, while recognizing no common carrier 
obligations for broadcasters, ~evertheless suggested that 
by ope.ning the-ir forum to some ·paid advertisements, the 
broadcasters could no~ discriminate against other types 
just because ~hey were of controversial tone. They con-
cluded: 
, •• the editorial advertising ban, particularly 
when licensees accept advertising generally,.esta-
blishes an unmistakable infringing of First Amend-
ment liberties.123 
The Court finally reiterated the Commission and 
licensee arguments. It countered each with its own, taking 
a constitutional view and then concluded by statings 
In the end, it may unse·ttle some of us to see an 
anti-war message ·or a political party message in 
the accustomed place of a soap or beer commercial. 
But we must not equate what is habitual with what 
is right - or what is constitutional. A society 
already so saturated with commercialism can well 
afford another outlet for speech on public issues. 
All that we may lose is some of our apathy ••• 124 
There was a dissenting opinion in this appellate case. 
Circuit Judge McGowan disagreed with the majority opinion 
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on the practicality of the rema~ding. He suggested that 
the task of formulating "reasonable regulations" · for edi-
torial advertising was more difficult ~han the majorit.y 
realized, He also stated that he nwas not convinced that 
the Constitution required the Commission to perform such 
125 
a task." . -He· suggested finally that the Commission review 
editorial advertising wh~n it reviewed the operation of the 
Fairness Doctrine, and added, "I would not order the 
.. 
Commission to undertake that review in a constitutional 
126 
strait jacket which dictates the results in advance," 
The major implications for editorial advertising that 
came ·from the appellate cases were that advertising time 
is differentiated from general programming; the Fairness 
, 
Doctrine does not eliminate complementary public debate 
in advertising timer a flat ban on editorial advertising 
is unconstitutional when other advertising is. allowed; 
and a system of regulating the use of editorial advertising 
should be established with the licensees still controlling 
the time, manner, and place of such advertising. 
Supreme Court Decision. On ~Ay 29o 1973, the United 
States Supreme Court rendered its decision on the contro-
versial BEM case and the status of editorial advertising in 
125 
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broadcast media. In a seven ·to two dec_isior1, the Supreme 
Court held that "neither the Communications Act nor the 
First Amendment required broadcasters to accept paid 
127 
editorial advertisements." Thi~ decision revers~d the 
62 
one of the Circuit Court and somewhat reinstated the deci-
sion of the Federal Communications Commission. 
The Court based part of its reasoning on legislative 
intent stating, "Congress has consistently rejected efforts 
to impose on broadcasters a •common carrier' right of access 
128 
for all persons wishing to speak on public issues." 
The Court was, of course, referring to the Communications 
Act and continued its reasoning by saying, "The 'public 
interest I standard of the c·ommunications Act. which incor-
porates the First Amendmentf does not require broadcasters 
129 
to accept editorial advertisements." 
The Court a~so believed that to implement the system 
suggested by the appellate court would risk that system 
130 
to monopoly by those who would pay the cost. They 
further stated that such a system would be . too impractical 
131 
for the Commission to handle effectively. 
127 
CBS v · •. . DNC; F.c.c. v • . BEM; Post-Newsweek Stations, 
Capital Area, Inc. v • . BEM; ABC v •. DNC. 41 LW 4688 (1973). 
128 
Ibid. 
129 
. Ibid. 
130 
l)l Ibid. 
Ibid. 
6) 
All of ~he previous reasoning~ howe~er, was based on 
the Supreme· Court • s interpretation that each licensee 
maintains "journalistic discretion" to meet its statut.ory 
and public obligations. The Court · throughout its decision 
referred to this concept. It stateda 
The lic~nsee policy challenged in this case is 
ultimately related to the journalistic role of a 
licensee for V~hich it has been given ·initial and 
primary responsibility by Congress, The ·licensee's 
policy against accepting editorial advertising c.annot 
be examined as an abstract proposition, but . must be 
viewed in the context of this jou~nalistic role ••• 
Moreover, the Commission has not fostered the licensee 
policy challenged here; it has simply declined to command 
particular action because it fell within the area of 
journalistic discretion.132 
The Court continued in this vein when reasoning against 
the argument that broadcaster policy and Commission ap-
proval constituted "state action .. thus allowing First 
Amendment application via the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court said s 
· ••• it would be anomalous for us to hold, in the 
name of promoting the constitutional guarantees 
of free .expression, that the day-to-day editorial 
decisions of broadcast licensees ~re subject to 
the kind of restraints urged by respondents. To 
do so in the name of the First mendment would be 
. a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would 
in many ways be lost to the rigid limita.tions that 
the First Amendment imposes on government... We 
therefore conclude that the policies complained of 
1)2 
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do not constitute governmental action violative of 
the First Amendment.133 
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The Supreme Court, agreeing with the McGowan dissent, 
criticized the appel~ate court . for being unrealistic in 
remanding t~e case to the Communication Commission. This 
criticism was centered on the fact that· such a remanding 
would have the effect of increasing .. government·al control 
134 
over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues." 
The Court ·also rebuked appe-llate court statements that 
licensee policy was discriminatory in favor of commercial 
advertising. It did so by discounting the.cases cited by 
the appellate court that called for open public forum. 
It differentiated those cases from the present one by 
citing the differences between public property, public 
transportation facilities, and broadcast facilities, It 
concluded 1 "• •• there i -s no 'discrimination• again·st 
135 
controversial speech present in this case." 
There were two dissenting opinions in this decision, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall generally opposed ·_ the 
decision of the majority to uphold the denial of edito-
rial advertising.- This • they said, inhibited robust 
133 
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and wideopen debate thus violating the First Amendment. 
Justice Brennan wrote for both Justices and divided 
the opinion into four areas, addressing the main points 
of the majority opinion~ The four areas pertained to 
. . 
government involvement, Fairness Doct~ine and journalistic 
discretion, bal.ancing First Amendment interests, and 
criticism of majority's fears elicittrl by the implementation 
of a regulatory scheme for editorial ~dvertising. 
The First Amendment can only apply to situations 
where the government or .its agencies have abridged free 
expression. This test has · also been extended to state 
and local governments by means of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. A critical segment of this case was whether or not 
the licensees, supported by the Communications Cownission, 
were government agencies or fiduciaries.-, Justice 
Brennan reminded the majority of five indicia which linked 
licensees with the government, Briefly, these indicia 
includeda public "ownership" of the airwaves as esta-
blished by the Communications Act; dependence of broad-
casters on the governmental control over the broadcast 
- industryJ specific gov~rnmental involvement in this case 
by means of Commission's ruling and Fairness Doctrine 
interpretations; and specific precedent in the case of 
1)6 
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak. 
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Justice Brennan, in the· second area · of his dissent, 
point~d out the inadequacies of the Fairness Doctrine 
in relation to .editorial advertising and concluded that 
it could not, in this case, provide, ·wide open debate, . 
He stateda 
As a practical matter, the Cour~•s reliance on 
the Fairness Doctrine as an 'adequate• alternative 
to editorial advertising seriously overestimates 
the ability - or willingness - of broadcasters to 
expose the public to the 'widest possible dissemin-
ation of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources•.,., in the commercial world of mass com-
munications~ it is simply bad business to espouse -
or even to allow others to espouse - the heterodox 
or the controversial. As a result, even under the 
Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to 
permit only established - or at least moderated -
views to enter broad~ast world's 'marketplace of 
ideas. '137 
He concluded by stating that the Fairness Doctrine was 
necessary to . broadcast regulation, but that its mere 
existence "cannot eliminate the need for a further, com-
plementary airing of controversial views through the 
138 
limited availability of editorial advertising," 
The third area of the dissent d"ealt with balancing 
the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters, listeners 
and· viewers, and access seekers, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that the First Amendment safeguarded those who 
wanted to "participate" in ~ebate as well as "hear" it. 
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He stated that this was particularly true nowadays because 
137 
Ibid •• p. 4716. 
138 
Ibid •• p. 4718. 
139 
of increased "anonymity." · He further suggested that 
this case dealt with advertising time, an area in which 
broadcasters do not normally have great editorial control. 
He supported the ideas of "open forumM and held that ·there 
wasJ indeed, discrimination in this case. He also 
pointed out the- irony of this case; i.e., traditionally, 
controversial -speech had been protected by the Consti-
tution, wherea~ commercial speech had not. He then 
concluded' 
Balancing those interests against the limited 
interest of broadcasters in exercising 'journalis-tic 
supervision• over the mere allocation of advertising 
time that is already made available to some members 
of the public, I simply cannot conclude that the 
interest of the broadcasters must prevail.140 
Justice Br.ennan finally addressed the major fears 
held by the Court. Those fears were: an editorial· 
advertising system might favor the wealthya application 
of the Fairness Doctrine might adversely affect itself; 
regulation of editorial advertising might increas~ govern-
141 
ment control of broadcasting. His reply to these fears 
was short. He suggested that, in light of his previous 
arguments, editorial advertising should be given an op-
139 
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portunity. He wrote, "We simply have no sure way of 
~nowing whether, and to what extent if any, these poten-
. . 142 
tial difficulties will actually materialize." · 
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The major implications for editorial advertising in 
the broadcast media derived from this Supreme Court deci-
sion were th~t- _neither .the Communications Act nor the · 
First Amendment requires broadcasters to accept such adver-
tising. Licensees are not common carriers, therefore 
advertisers have no right of access. 
An extensive dissenting opinion attempted to show 
that editorial advertising was protected by the First 
Amendment and would not disrupt licensee's journalistic 
discretion when being used to complement Mrobust" and 
"wideopen" debate. 
Other Media 
Le.gal opinions on editorial advertising in other 
media have been largely confined to that space sold for 
advertising purpos es by public transportation companies. 
Like print media, definite precedents have been established 
and little controversy has risen. 
Two decisions, noted earlier, helped establish this 
precedent. One of these was Wirta v 0 , Alameda-Contra Costa 
142 
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Transit District, This decision involved an organization 
known as Women For Peace who attempted to place antiwar 
advertisements on local bus card space. 
The advertising agency, representing the transit. 
company, refused to sell the space to the organization 
becaus·e of its policy rejecting advertising· of a contro..:. 
"144 
versial nature, 
The Supreme Court of California held that the "content 
of the advertisement in question is undeniably protected 
by the First Amendment," They continued to state that 
just because the message was paid for did not mean that 
it was not in the realm of protected speech. The Court 
also dismissed the busline•s arguments stating that the 
c.ompany had already allowed advertising and it was a 
public utility. It therefore could not deny that its 
145 
buses were a forum for free speech. 
The Court conceded that the company could regulate 
the time, place, and manner, but also saids 
Transit advertising .is an acceptable and effective 
means of communication. A regulation which permits 
those who offer goods and services for sale and those 
who wish to express ideas relating to elections 
access to such forum while d€nying it to those who 
143 
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desire to express other ideas and beliefs, protected 
by the First Amendment, cannot be upheld.t46 
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Based on this decision, t ·he Court affirmed an injunc-
tion which permitted . Women For Peace to place their message, 
The other precedent for editorial advertising came in 
. 147 
Kissinger v, r -New York City Transit Authority, a case 
which considered the sale of advertising space in local 
subway systems. 
The subway system refused to. place the posters of 
Students For a Democratic · Society because they violated 
their acceptance policies, being controversial and "offen 
. 148 
siv.e to good taste." 
Although not ruling on the case, Judge Bonsal of 
District Court of New York stated: 
Plaintiff's poste~~ are an expression of political 
views. They are not obscene or profane. Consequently, 
the Authority and the Advertising Company cannot 
refuse to accept the posters for display unless the 
posters present a serious and immediate threat to 
the safe ahd efficient operation of the subways ••• 
(furthermore) they cannot refuse to accept the pos-
ters for display because· they are •entirely too 
controversial ••• •t49 
The Court concluded -by saying that the "Authority and the 
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Advertising Oompany cannot accep~ · some ·posters ·~nd refuse 
plaintiff's for reasons that conflict with the First 
150 
Amendment." 
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These two cases clearly define the use of editorial 
advertising in media supported by public utilities, All 
First Amendment rights pertained to opinion advertisements 
in these media, Furthermore, the precedent of open public 
forum was developed to entail this type of advertising. 
SUMMARY 
The use of editorial advertising to maintain free 
expression has relied heavily on the philosophy that the 
First Amendment provides access to the media. Proponents 
of this philosophy have suggested that the First Amendment 
be interpreted to include a right of access because con-
temporary applications of it have been paradoxical; i.e., 
media have used their right of free press to pursue busi-
ness and suppress individual free speech. Opponents to 
a right of access believed that the media and not the 
government, or people, should promote access, 
Editorial advertising has been used in the print 
media to express opinions. This use was supported by the 
United States Supreme Court, Examples appeared in large 
daily newspapers and school newspapers. 
150 
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The use of editorial advertising in broadcast media 
has been debated ex~ensively. Some licensees have refused 
it and stated that its acceptance would hurt their business 
because opponents would demand free reply time. This 
refusal policy was declared unconstitutional by an ap-
pellate court, but generally upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Opinion advertisements have .been used in other media 
such as bus . company card space and subway station posters. 
These uses have been declared c.onstitutional by state courts 
due to the concepts of "open public forum" and "governmental 
fiduciaries." 
Chapter 4 
ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The constitutional background of a free expression 
system has been examined and the modern institution of 
advertising has been suggested as an aid in maintaining 
that system in a rapidly advancing, technological society. 
Editorial advertising has been suggested as the specific 
. . 
tool to accomplish free expression.. Its uniqueness has 
been discussed in relation to other forms of advertising 
and editorializing. Its uses have been seen and its legal 
status reviewed, 
There are, however, a few questions remaining con-
cerning the future use of editorial advertising, First, 
what are the paramount issues surrounding the continued 
and expanded use of editorial advertising? If its use is 
to be expanded, then how might it be implemented to fit 
into existing mass media? Finally, what aspects of edi-
torial advertising and its use for free expression need 
further research? 
PARAMOUNT ISSUES 
There is very little doubt that editorial advertising 
can be used to communicate opinions. The crucial issue, 
however, is whether or not the "gatekeepers" will sell 
7J 
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their space or time so that the advertisements may be exposed 
to the public. The question of media access was discussed 
initially in Chapter 3, but at this point those arguments 
must be reconsidered within the context of the first two 
chapters. 
Print Media 
Access to newspapers via editorial advertising, as 
shown in Chapter J, has generally been accepted as a result 
of Times v • . Sullivan and Zucker v •. Panitz. This accep-
tability must not, however, be construed as a right of 
access. Editors still retain the right to refuse adver- . 
151 
tising of any nature. 
The right to refuse advertising _has usually been 
expressed in newspapers·• business policies, and varies 
from paper to paper. Specific reaction to the acceptance 
' 
of various editorial advertisements was the subject of a 
152 
recent survey. The results showed that while some of 
~he papers would accept some of the editorial ads, all 
153 
papers emphasized their ultimate right to refuse. 
These general policies are best expressed by an 
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excerpt from the "Advertising Acceptability Guide" of 
the Chicago Tribune. It states, "'Advertising of a con-
tro~ersial nature is ·acceptable only if approved. by a 
. 154 
Tribune divisional advertising manager,'" 
Other n_e'!V_s_papers, like the New York Times, have 
expressed their general right to refuse, but have also -
. -
specifically stated the need to· apply the First Amendment 
to advert is in~. The Times has stated, · 
••• The Times believes that, in furtherance of the 
objectives of the First Amendment of the Constitution, 
it should keep its advertising columns open to all 
points of view, no matter how strongly it disapproves . 
of them. -
Subject of course to the laws of libel and the 
bounds of decency and good taste and the requirements 
of factual accuracy, we think the principle of freedom 
.of the press not only requires us to report events and 
occurrances of which we disapprove e ... but als .. o imposes 
on us the obligation to accept advertising of books 
whose contents we reject and of politi~al parties 
and movements whose goals we despise, 
· The guarantees of the First Amendment are not 
mere guarantees of the publishers' right to publish, 
They are, more importantly, guarantees of the public's 
right to know, We consider that that is what a free 
press truly meanss the maintenance of open communi-
cation in the realm of ideas.155 
Since this editorial was printed, advertising of 
controversial opinions was directly supported by the 
Times v • . Sullivan decision. In that decision, even 
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advertisements containing libelous statements did not 
detract from the ma~ issue of free expression. Further-
more, there is some evidence that only the advertiser .may 
156 be held libel and not the vehicle ~f communication. 
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Access to the newspapers will prob~bly continue to 
be the crucial .hurdle for opinion advertisers. However, 
due to the reduced risk of libel suits against publishers; 
the publishers~ knowledge that they ultimately retain the 
right to refuser and the increased incidence of court 
decisions recognizing editorial advertisements as free 
speech, it appears that opinion advertisements will, for 
all practical purposes, increasingly continue to be ~ccep-
ted thus lowering the hurdle. 
Broadcast Media 
The main issues that have emerged from attempts to 
buy air time for opinion advertising have been, like· print 
media, access and competing constitutional rights. 
Broadcasters, as seen in Chapter J, have considered 
themselves to be part of the "press" and thus entitled 
to First Amendment protections from government interference. 
They are, unlike printed m~dia, regulated by a federal 
agency. This dual nature has created a complex problem 
for the licensee and anyone who wishes access for free 
156 
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speech purposes. Results of this complex problem were 
seen in the extended review of those cases involving access 
for editorial advertising. 
The result . of the court cases was the opinion of 
a majority of the Supreme Court that the First Amendme·nt 
-- -
did not compel licensees to accept editorial advertise-
ments, despite their status of protected speech, and 
broadcasters had "journalistic discretion" to choose the 
manner by which they would meet public interest obligations. 
The Court, in essence, treated the broadcasters like the 
printed press, but the printed press has generally 
accepted editorial advertisements, This general accep-
tance was pointed out in Mr. Douberley's survey of major 
daily newspapers. 
Confusion over access rights., and more basically 
competing constitutional rights, begins when recalling 
the arguments of licensees en route to the final Supreme 
Court decision. Licensees claimed that the Fairness 
Doctrine and the Communications Act sufficiently satis-
fied the public's First Amendment rights. The Supreme 
Court, reviewing legislative action (Communications Act} 
and federal agency precedent (Fairness Doctrine}, agreed 
that the best manner to .meet public interest obligations 
was to allow licensees journalistic discretion over their 
air time. Yet, it was also stated that licensees may, 
if they choose, accept editorial advertisements. To 
do this, broadcasters maintained, would subject them to 
78 
Fairne.ss Doctrine obligations and potentially destroy 
their business and integrity by giving free time to oppo-
nents of particular opinion ads. How can the Fairness Doc-
trine, in relation to editorial advertising, satisfy indivi-
dual free speech, if its mere existence frightens broad-
casters into refusing such advertisements? The existence of 
this paradox does not seem consistent with the maintenance 
of a free expression system. 
Broadc.asters have also argued that they have temporary 
property rights because they "lease" electromagnetic fre-
quencies from the government. This argument, however is 
limited. It involves conflicting constitutional rights · 
(licensees property v. citizens' free expression). Balan-
cing these rights has been settled in Marsh v. Alabama. That 
case involved a woman arrested for trespassing while distri-
buting religious literature in a company-owned town. Justice 
Black, delivering the Court's opinion, stated: 
Wheti we balance constitutional rights of owners of 
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom 
of the press and religion·:. we remain mindful of the 
fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.157 
Also se·en in these recent editorial advertising cases 
were competing First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court 
clearly stated in their Red Lion decision that the public's 
rights of speech were "paramount." The existence of this 
type of competition does not seem consistent with 
the complementary relationship of sp~ech and press 
157 Marsh v. Alabama 326 u.s. 501, 509, 1946. 
.. 
necessary for the maintenance of a ·free expression 
system • 
. Editorial advertising could not only provid·e free 
expression, but also .reinstate the· complementary rela-
tionship if the Fairness Doctrine was not compelled upon 
broadcasters, who would otherwise be willing ·to accept 
such advertising •. "The ability to rent or use mass 
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158 
media ••• is a clear alternative to a 'fairness doctrine.'" 
Other issues, repeatedly raised concerning attempts 
to buy broadcast advertising time for opinions, were 
inappropriateness of format and d.ominance by the weal thy. 
The latter issue would be a problem of implementation and 
regulation. The inappropriateness of format has been 
shown to be a minor and moot argument; e.g., Jaffe has 
stated a 
••• such reasoning may be thought an expression of 
intellectual snobbery, The uncomplicated truths and 
falsehoods most apt for mass media may be better and 
more succinctly said in one than five minutes. The 
message at least alerts. the listener to the issue 
and, if it comes from a source which he trusts or 159 
distrusts, helps him to find his way to taking sides ••• 
Furthermore, the oversimplification of issues, programs·, 
and other forms of communication already exists in the 
158 
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broadcast media due to time lim~ts •·. . Editorial adver-. 
tising, therefore,would be just as appropriate as the 
standard two-m·inute editorial and might enhance · free · 
expression by offering divergent · viewpoints. 
8'0 
Until evidence is obtained indicating the willing-
ness of broadcasters to accept editorial advertising, with 
and without Fairness Doctrine obligations, the data sug- · 
gests that use of opinion ads on radio ·or television will 
meet heavy opposition. It must be reiterated, however, 
that there is no law or governmental policy which speci-
fically prohibits editorial advertisements from being 
broadcast • 
. It appears that •· in spite of ~he recent Supreme ~ 
Court decision, similar attempts at gaining access to 
paid air time will continue in an effort to realize free 
expression. These attempts will probably result in legal 
action if the advocat$construct arguments based on their 
First Amendment rights of free speech. 
Eventually, broadcasters, like publishers, will pro-
bably accept editorial advertising in light of public 
161 
opinion secure in the knowledge that they still retain 
160 
no iss 
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their journalistic discretion. 
Other Media 
·The main issues concerning the use of editorial 
advertising in media other than print or broadcast 
have generally_centered on the concept of "open public 
forum." If the particular medium or vehicle in question 
already accepts advertising, then editorial ads will 
probably also be accepted, provided that they are not -
obscene and do not present a clear and_ present danger 
to the public. 
Should attempts to place editorial advertising in 
media such as busline card space, trains, subways, taxis, 
or other public facilities, be rej'ected due to a pa·rti-
cular company's policy then advertisers would probably 
have a good legal case based on free spe.ech arguments. 
There is not sufficient evidence to pre~ict the 
possible results of attempts to secure advertising space 
in exclusively private media such as outdoor advertising 
boards. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
8'1 
The future use of editorial advertising depends on 
the development of a uniform system whereby opinion adver-
tisements, which meet general standards of obscenity, 
libel, and clear and present danger, can be recognized 
as .frae expression. Such a system must contain practical 
regulations for purchasing of media space or time, This 
latter prereq~isite is especially n~cessary for·· broadcas.t 
media. ~lso, some provisions must be made for indivi-
duals or groups who have neither the talent nor the · · 
immediate purchasing power to create and finance their 
own o·pinion ads. 
- - -
The problem of identifying editorial advertisements 
as such might be solved by assuming the definition pre-
sented in this text, They must clearly express opinions 
on public issues and must not be sponsored by profit-
making entities who may eventually profit by sucn adver-
tisements, Standards of obscenity, libel, and clear and 
present danger would be the same as other advertisements, 
programs, or editorial material; i.e,, ·the messages would 
•· 
have to meet those standards of the m~dia sought. 
The area of "which messages" and "how manyn proves 
to be the most taxing problem, The p~oblem, however, 
would not be too difficult to overcome in print media 
which already accepts advertising of this nature. Broad-
cast media pose quite a different problem. 
An implementation system for editorial advertising . 
on radio and television would require the cooperation of 
licensees and the Federal Communications Commission to 
establish uniform guidelines of selection. A realistic 
approach would not be overwhelming, as suggested by the 
Supreme Court's decision in the BEM case. Nor would it 
be as simple as the first-come-first-served suggestion of 
Commissioner Johnson. 
8'2 
8) 
A pract~cal system co~ld b~ similar ·to tha~ of present 
time purchasing procedures with the following additionsa 
An agreed percentage of licensees• total advert-ising would 
be made available for potential editorial·advertisements. 
This criterion would be imposed when requests exceeded 
time alloted, A daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc., 
limit would be· placed on the number of spots purchased 
. . 
by a particular sponsor. Spots could be heard in advance 
to avoid duplicate opinion by differing sponsors. In 
that case, a cooperative effort.might be suggested. 
Priority should be given, when possible, to messages 
162 
whose timelines are of essence. 
For those persons who do not have the time, talent, 
or immediate finances to create and place editorial 
advertisements, agencies and credit unions might fill the 
void. Examples of supplemental organizations already 
exist. 
Public interest advertising groups are proli-
ferating on the west coast and in Washington put to 
serve public issues ranging from drug abuse to saving 
endangered whales,,,(One such agency)Public Interest 
. Communications is described by its founders as the · 
nation's first full-service, non-commercial adver-
tising agency, Initial clients include the American 
Civil Liberties Union.16J 
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Private agencies like Public Interest Communications would 
help assure that potential editorial advertising, espe-
cially in broadcast media, would not be dominated by the 
wealthy. This agency is funded by the Stern and Kaplan 
164 
funds, 
A· similar ·· agency known as Public Advertising Council 
considers its~lf as "a clearinghouse where org~nizations 
without the means or the creative apparatus can get their 
165 
views translated into public interest communications." 
These agencies have practical roles,_as well as 
social ones. Editorial advertise.me.nts createq. and placed 
by them would probably have a greater chanc~ of be_ing 
accepted. This notion was somewhat supported by Mr. 
Tracy Westen director of Stern Community La:IV' Firm, who 
said, "stations have been reluctant to give time for 
public ·service messages other than tho·se which reach them 
166 . 
through the Advertising Co uric il. " 
Another aid to fair implementation of editorial 
advertising ould be through government loans. Emerson 
has suggested a positive promotion of free expression by 
writing, 
Government funds that enable private individuals 
164 
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or groups to engage in expression are being made 
available in many fields at ·the · pre'sent time,.. · 
There are also government subsidie.s for the promo-
tion of art and entertainment projects, for legal 
assistance in protecting First Amendment rights, 
for various types of community organizations and 
activities und~r the poverty program ••• The most 
direct form of government spending in the aid of 
expression is the allowance of · tax deductions for 
political _ ~gntributions or the free printing of 
position· leaflets in political campaigns,167 
An extension of Emerson's suggestion could be made to 
opinion messages. Less fortunate individuals might seek 
government loans to .finance advertisements. Others may 
deduct the cost of expressing their views from their 
taxes, 
The idea that editorial advertising would be 
dominated by the wealthy is diminished when one considers 
. . 
the · criteria for implementation and various ·method-s by 
which non-wealthy persons or groups could achieve ex-
pression. A"S Justice Brennan suggested in his opinion 
on the BEM ·case, it is worthy to attempt and as Judge 
Wright stated in the same case before his court, .. all 
168 
that we may lose is some of our apathy .... 
Implementation of a system to integrate editorial 
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advertising into the mass media can. be .the practical step 
needed to help eliminate the competing First Amendment 
rights of individuals and media managers. Methods have 
been suggested that would maintain ·the independe~ce of · 
the publishers and licensees, as well as their revenue. 
and allow the public the essence of a .free society - the 
right to express opinions from one to many, 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study, being an exploratory analysis, has 
raised many questions demanding empirical investigation. 
For example, survey research is needed to follow Mr. 
Douberley's study examining which .and how many newspapers 
do accept editorial advertising. ~ore data is needed to 
determine under what standards it would be acceptable, 
A similar survey is desperately needed to determine the 
attitudes of broadcast licensees toward editorial adver-
tising. How many licensees accept it? · How many even 
know what it is? If they do or do not accept it, then 
what are their reasons? Special attention should be paid 
to the effect of the Fairne-ss Doctrine on acceptance of 
editorial advertisinge 
Surveys of the same basic nature are needed from 
media such as public television and outdoor advertising 
companies. 
Based on the arguments from the legal cases that 
controversial issues would bore or infuriate readers, 
viewers, and listeners, experimental res arch might be 
87 
. . 
conducted comparing attitudinal and be~avioral reactions 
between editorial advertisements and commercial advertise-
ments, 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was designed to examine editorial adver-
tising within the context of the First Amendment. Such 
examination was intended to determine whether or not 
editorial advertising is .a means of free expression. The 
determination was made on the ·following bases: (1) the 
differentiation of editorial advertising from other forms 
of advertising and from editorializing; (2) its legal 
statust {J) its practical uses. 
A review of the relevant rese.arch has suggested that 
editorial advertising maintains a unique position compared 
to commercial advertising. It is protected speech as 
defined by the First Amendment. It has also been differ-
entiated from other ·forms of editorializing due to its 
paid nature. This has allowed individuals to express their 
opinions unedited~ 
Legal cases involving editorial advertising have 
suggested that it has been accepted by major national 
newspapers and has been supported as free expression. Its 
use in broadcast media has been se~iously questioned for 
practical reasons, but there has been no dictum prohi-
biting such use. The main issues resulting in attempted 
use of editorial advertisements have been over a right of 
access to the media as an extension of the Firs·t Amendment. 
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No such right has been granted, 
Implementation of a system to regulate the use of 
editorial advertising has been the most difficult problem. 
Recent suggestions, however, seem to have mitigated some 
of the earlier doubts, It has also been suggested that 
public opinion will eventually demand, .at least a trial 
and error period to test its use, particularly in broad-
cast media • . 
A need has also been suggested to supplement legal 
opinions and practical implementation plans of editorial 
advertising with empirical research. 
As society grows more complex, the need to express 
one's opinion to the community becomes more and more 
essential if we are to maintain a semblance of freedo·m, 
and democracy, Editorial advertising is one tool within 
a modern institution that has proven .to help meet these 
increasing needs for free expression. 
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Richard Nixon has not left us in doubt. He means 
b function a.OOve the law. fl he is allowed to con-
tinue, then the destruction of the Bill ot Ri.:Jhts cou!d 
follow. H. after all the Watergate revelationS, w~ allow 
him to continue. we are accomplices to that 
destruction. 
ConS-der what has already haPC€r100: 
• On Jul)' 23. 1970, the President P.ersonally 
approved the "Huston plan" tor poli:ca! surveillance 
by such metll<Xis as burg!ary, wiretapping, eaves-
dropping, mJil covers a:lCI spying on stu<::ents by 
the CIA and other agencies. These metr.OOs 1tere 
employex:l against dissenters, political OP'IX)nents, 
ne.vs n:~rters, and government emp!oyees. 
• ~11971, the President establ:shed .... ~!hin'the Whrta 
House a personal secret police (the "plumbers'') 
~rating outside the restraintc; of law, and engJg-
ing in burgl3ry, i!l£gal wiretaps, espionage and 
perj:Jry. 
• Wht.le Daniel 81sberg was facing tr:al, his psycrJ-
a!rlc records . v ere burgl:;rizoo by 'N;•ite House 
a :des and, a: the direction of the President, a White 
House aJde discussed tr.e d:rectorship of the -fBI 
vli!h the judge presiding over Ellst:erg's tria!. 
~ Prr:ate detectives were hired 'rJ.{ wr.:~e House aides 
to spy on the sex lite, drinking ha!:ltts and family 
problems or political opr.onents. 
• Supporters of possible pr~ential opponents of 
Presidl:n! Nixon were marked as "enemie5" on a 
special list. and targeted for harassment by the Inter-
nal Re..-enue Service. 
• Dtlring thrl*! days in May 1971, over 13,000 
people were illegaHy arr~ted in Washington, D.C. 
The dragnet arrests, unprecedented in AmetlV!n 
history, Wt.'ffi declared uneunsb:U:K:Jnal 'rJy u-~ courts. 
To ju5ti ly the arrests, a V/hite House spokesm:ln, 
WiiEam R~:hnquist, invented 'tha doctnne ot "quali-
f.ed martial law.'' 
•In 1973, tho Pre--..,ident borr:bod Camtxxf:a, a neu-
tral country. w1thout the authorilahon of Congress. 
We learned tntur that he hJd bc.-en oomblng Cam· 
bxiiJ torthrceye;usand r.a d ~ ~bera!elyconcea:oo 
tho bombing from ConrJrC"~". and from 10 p:o<jpll:', 
tl e~et:tt ur.urping the war·1r. l j ng p::ivr·rs of Cvn-
gr.ess. When tr.o d.:u:;t.on w:l': re-, ""..tit..'tl, :hJ Prtri-
den( r..:3:d he would do u.o samo thtng un<k:r SlmilJr 
circum:;tanct:S. 
• The President has transformed grand juries into 
instruments of political surveillance and r.arassment, 
and caused pot:tica!!y motiva ed indictments to issue. 
• The President has attacked tAe freedom cf tho 
press, and subjected news reportars to illegal wire-
taps aro harassing FBI investigations. 
TOO doct;ne o: "inher9nr power 
Richard Nixon i:> not the first president to violate 
consntutional rights and he wi!l not l:::e the last 
But r.o president has ever before systematically 
claimed that the Bill of Rights, whict1 limits o her 
go~ment officiab, does not limit the Pres!dent or 
his agents. 
When he wiretapped in V.olation of the Constitu-
tion. he claimed an "inherent' po\ver to do so. 
When he secretiy oombcd Camt:xxlia, he claimed 
an ·inherenr' power to do so. 
When he directed the drag nat arrests of thou-
sands of demonstrators in Washing on, he claimed 
an ·;nr:erenr' povver to do so 
If the President is po:;m1itted to use the doctrine of 
~inherent" poy,ter to override the Bill of Rights a y-
lime he plc::ases, civil liberties can be cancelled 
at whim. 
The President or the United St:Jtes shouid SfTTlbol-
ize Ollr sr-.tem of individual rights under law. He sets 
the precedent for fUiure presiden ts. As U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said in a 
m.li?c..U~M~B~~~r;:;;:~a 
American Civil lloordos Union ~ 
84 Fdih A·ICnue. Ne·.v York, N.Y. 10011 U 
c Enclosed is my contribution of S r~ 
to he!o !he lrn;.oc.Jchment Campaign. U 
ol am w::.inq 10 write mt R presentative, ~ 
and participate in tho Impeachment ~ 
Campa;gn. P!easA conl3ct me. (j 
c! wa1t 1o pin ACLU. Credit ·my contribu- 8 
n IO'N:!rds membership: r1 
c $ 15 !ndiVldual o S2 5 Joint o Mora l4 
ll Name ci 
Addrocs f~ 
B 
~ 
1928 Yi.ret!spping V~..se: 
In a govemrrrenc of laws, exfs!ence of the go~ 
ernment wi'! re imoenl:d if it fags to observe !he 
law scrupulouslr. Our {;O'.<€mment is the po.'enC 
the omnipresent teacher. For gcoo or for iU, it. 
teaches the whole p:;r..J()Ie l:!! its exam~. Crl m 
is rontagious. If t/',1'1 go•~rrrent l:Yx:omes a 
lavf-breaf:er; it bre€d5 contempt for law; it inv.tes 
e\lery man to recome a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy. To dedare rr.a in the adminis-
tration of. .. Jaw ~~~ end jus:i{;es the· means._ 
would bring terrib!e r e~iouton._._ 
To preset\'9 and PfOtect cur system of in<f.~kiua! 
r)ghts under law, to restore tr.e in:'3Jn:Y of the Siil Of 
Rights br ~sand our children, and to make the 
lesson dear to al futura t::res:Cents in Wr.os.9 hc:r.ds 
we place our lives. Ricr.ard N~ must s>.and ~.al 
before tt-.a Sena!e.lf he coes not sEnd tria!, what he 
has done wi I re dor!e b'f otrers. 
How to Impeach President Nix en 
In order to sta:ld tnat before the ~:e. where a 
tv:o·thirds vote is n~ry for con·i.ctXJ."l, o·:e Presc-
dentmustfirs:ooacc~bya ma:oriryofthe House 
of Representa'.:•.us. This aN"f.JS2._"'.an by tt .e HO'.JSe is 
ca!:ed im~r:hment !moe<!~ ment itstlf d003 not 
result in L'le remo·tal ot the Pr~t UKe an indd-
men. i merely D?;;insa t:'..;!. lmpP...ad",ment !s v.t:at 
the Hot.'Se of Re;xas.en~:r.-es does; lt'.t! actual trial 
is held by tt~e ~;,;!e. v;~ oo:ie.-e such a tr a1 must 
take place, ho •teVer un~e;:_sant 
The country can v.1tlistar.d the resi;)naron of the 
Vice Pres:denl 
The country can Yi.!hstand the impeachment o( 
the President. 
The coon !I)' ccnnot w!hstand a S'f31em of !Xesi-
dentia! oower un:imitoo 'rlt the BJ ol H!]t'1ts. 
If you t:A.:Iie ,-e tha t Pre:;;dc-nt !.tOO should oo 
brought o tnaf b0!ora e Senate for tus Vl<)(a:..oro 
of civ1l hbertles. jotn tho campaj)n !or imoPJ3Chmenl 
Ma~e your voce count tn de~~ o( u ;e 81li of Rt;;h~. 
v- (1tc your RP.CX!:<:.t .'f1:.a ' ·IQ n Ccc;Jw::; in w~ oort 
of tmccachm~-fl t. And. d 'w('...U are net t .:t a mcmr.er 
ol ACLIJ. P:Da!'..e u-:,e !ho ccu~ !o ~n. V,CJ ~'Dd 
your t -~» 11"1 tl'us c.t.:nuc .. 'Ury camp.;i)n for im· 
r.rochrncnt ar.o in mo dd till day OJI cj(}.c:fl!.e ot the 
s.:1 o1 rr~nt<> . 
APPENDIX B 
''r;, trKi•t Jff(l{''"''•t •l tuet{ar ... " 
'""•••lrtt:<HU &, flttrOtl l.I ,,..,t/u•t 
HeedTl1eir 
•rr h: tS.t So.tlt,Jcmrtl.i"t uJ,,.,t,....;.bl,, • •• 
ul c.~trtJtltrJ t.~tir,.U.·,., r;~ictl, 
for l).q arl!J b1 J.r~Kl.'' 
A.; 6o ,1-:Jc wor!c! \:,......, t-r tllnf', ~~ c! . So:t'X:-t: ~ t~'tJ t t"'J<J:r:... a-c Cl'(a:c....! ir: ~~'<• 
~ ~:otcut ckn.J.~T~nL..,:u L, f'O'-Ll'Y. a!!i.""lT-4• 
t.M:a o!t!.,c ri;!:t c.,~\~( i;, ~~.l:J c : t;"~:-r 1 .! t '•.art:.:r"C"d 
., l!..: li. S. Cc;u:;ru!~'CI or.J t!,: f>\1! o! R;,-,:., u 
t!.:i:- c.ffe~ 't*'t t.:;.C:-SJ ttcsc t ' !:l :" lti" :_'"'t. •• ~ .~. ( : .-c- x;"'• 
.. . .-.:t ~y eon \U'".,)N...:.t:J:,~t':"..! 'W';t ... c f..f !4nt..r b]' tlfOI;C ""~ 
·· ·....-et..~ &::;- &-'1!-.c._::.t.:.~n~ &as-.::-:--: .,.:...;;,h L\~M": '\!.n 
...-w~ loeb \.700 •• ld'".i--., the p<1r\.I::"'JI lor c;:,G.;ra. 
~--· 
h ~~ckt.S. •J ::, C.rO::D''- l<!- : :: (.))~ 
)"e'l-~!~!jy JO,ll !~t to eu"!' c! .>U!h.."ZU :.J •:'l\J DJ!f!:~ :: ~~4.h 
cocrccrJ in I!~ tk.J• ;I'\C"13 Ci••r-.::. tJ~, - ·ue j;,~~~~f 
cjc<:u.l. !Jow-1><>nl. """~<d t.> the .;;;, ir. lu.:zint 
"ot!:.cr "''L:-.h f.rt b?'f':1, •r.ht:,1 tc o·u~ ·e.r~ ~..:: ·.ktl 
S.t·• ~ "'-""" b~" i.n: t.:·A:dc lol a:.;n-1 !o: i>o<::.1 
in d:c b;r.cr a~!c!. 
In :'>l=tt,..,c..-;·. Al:h-.... .~:c,. r..>&:<-.u 1.!.0{ 
~fyCr.o..t11t:y, Tu c!T~""" t.'tc~!e C..;: cwl <~<;>< , 
t.\e.ir ~c.n ~~~ C"l;'C::;c:J !rc-t*'t ..._-Q..::..;,f. ~..! tr~k· 
lcn<h ~r p->li<-c: a:"totJ .. ':.h a.' <!'"'· ' :u.d t!'>:·;u 
r\tttc<t!>< Ah~nu s-... :. c;,:.c,~ un..-.L ""= ::. ~ 
c:n~ire L"'.o..!cont 1>--~'1· ~: n:d t.> a'a :c t ,;:~''"i<ics b1 
ft~i."t.( tn l't"·:"t',;..:c:r, t!Y.'ir ( .,i"'! •a !l -.u ~rJ. 
kclaS in L"\ at:c:C"';< b ,:.:r;n"e CKr.J in:., r::r-!:u..:oa. 
Tit 'l•tt:""C; . '''1C~. -.A_.tf.:r!t, ~:., ,' .o.il'.: . ~.& '•"Z ."U\.'\~ 
G~'-e:"'>, :'\(~.,-.~;..;._ F. ,c.>. "\'>::>i, C.:·ulo!"4 L"<l 1. 
b-><1: o! ether cities ic. t.'-e Sou:~. l'"-"t . .\r..cric::: t.c" J>-
8(<rs,;, f.Je>< 111 the c::t!:c or:; ; :.c e>C cil=-:..U att!c t;-:-t.• 
- 1'1CI.l1 &.:ICt f'l'- p?m.:", h.HC llq~.!Jr~ Jx<~ U 
~!At:>nu-..s r.C de~NX:Mq. n..rr toe.:·•!• '"" an:t$ 
i>•t rc:.:ninc h.a•c ir.sri:c<l nt.1 lit..c.l 1:2-l t i'l'r.l & IK'o(' 
G.i~:t ir-r to lh• cau«: oi lrc-c&:.:n. 
Sm>-'1 •Of'.!er th•t ~ 5<-:l.u" ,i,)~,:"" ,.r ~ 
Cv,~ i:",;'Wl F·CJr 1..\iJ ccw. c•At ·,.;z·.::'lt J::~nd o.t 
rr( cf!.')f'lt fi.,:! .rcr •• ; t: \"C'!J u ~ ,-:-,. f:-lr th: C'~~c iin t 
r :,:h.:·t,...\"\tfc rr'lVC'n:lr"nt Sm.&..H "'u.."\.kr th l[ Lh.c:y c:o 
· ~4(:-n~ !n-:J to d.::••rl)y ti-c ~' -:.r..:a:'\ .,. !,~ ,. ... r c: r.h;-,: 
C.r.)· e:Jur. rrt'J\~I;tn L~ r.C'f/C s._-,;.~ :: 1'\.-:~ ,..C":"?i,.: tho 
S¢ur~-tloc Rev. U<. ~:,,.._,, t~~;,.,. K~,t. ]:, " <>ri.! · 
foun<'U11c&d•r ol t'>c . !'.11'=-t ""'<f)' !1u1 !'ro>:~ F..,. i: 
i:r hi.t t.k<t r;o.c o~ t.t"f't·' foi: t.c;; ,.., ~.ich hn i;.Jt,.:I"'C;:t 
•nJ t uickd the ,:Yc..:C\U in t:-.c~ : n i.!:::i:l '! ,..., c: ~! .;~. 
i:u: anJ i.: t.h;-c a.u::.: Ur. k ir..! ,..l~ lo-.: r . .kJ a:d is 
y::-c:.id.:,•t of t.l..:. "S.loO..t!!t.t'ra. L~ri~U:\ f..n..!...-rt! O:.:t• Co ...... 
ft. rc1':::~hc o:-t"lnfz~tioa t.hh:!-\ &., •f<".at!•cl:!:n .( tho 
•~=:-tin: ri:,h~-:~"~e nlO\"':tnC:l C.. t,;ndcr br . .:_ ,,.f• 
cfiro~t =.tT(\ c ~~ ~d~n~ip Cc,o~,o:rt.:r .... ""C ('nf"..:fo.A.-..J $::J-
d<n~ ~·crl.. .. ~ • :oJ s.,,inor1 i.-, t!>e ~J.:oor,;Jty and 
.... ~~U< O{ DOJ·Vifl!=nt fbi~~ 
A!•in t:~.d c~:.ia d-..e ~~rn ,.;..>!:!.n-: h:"t"e 
•:..r.Tcrc:d Or. K~(J pcc:cC.....J pn.;.:C(U ".t.'l i.~ t tfT\'-!1.• 
Lt:Jn a:-.. f .,~, r c::.c-e. They 1-..:,·e Mn:~ b~, j-: , .,.1'\C' e :r.,or:, 
lt ~!\nc hi> ,. ,(c uo<! eitold. Ther i:.w: •=c:::J !l;s 
s:,.cn..,n. Ti..cr h4\"C trrn:.:cl hi-::1 t.:\ o:t \ li:':"<)-!c.~ 
•,.....c-c.Ji:tt.• -;..,ir.-rin{" t:\:i t.i:-l i!..:.r • c'ic::u..."'1.. ... Ao.:! 
•~ t."lC"y h. vc ch:art '!:.i 0..:.:\ ..,. j:.,;_ ·FC ·! ·~"')· ·-~ ftlv.1 
11nocr .. t.i:!l th:y c"d-i i::l:>ri.soo bic.> t~r /"" 1•:-rr. 
(iO~,..n{y, c.."t: ir rc:.I! :'~~~a to rc:n.J1>C' bi::"t ~") ... ;_. 
c.:i1 u the lc;d<:l' to w!:locn L'lc J:~~t1 a:l<! ~ 
Your I-Ielp Is Urgently I~c~ded • • • 
So.!o U.., 
~~-~ 
,._1 'f .. AM.!oo 
...... ~ 
....,:.. a..:..•-... 
Do • .A!~-c.ct 
.. ~);~~ 
.. ?._ .. ~ 
lt....U.l ... ~ .• 
...... Lo!.., ._,. 
~'--' 
..... .... l!l. .u~ 
( .. -.-'f,.t!.o1 
a ..... J..~L~ 
~-·"·J 
..... r.~, k.l..t t.....:4 
~.,J..:._t-.J 
··-· 1r'.A. o....;;, (Gcl-, .. r-J 
a... c. c. Sl..l. 
v.z.._ ... to..J 
e.,~~O·l.cr 
•~v. 
Nt Go-t c:.-
o-,1 C,..:...l 
~~ro....!.'.J..ra 
~j,_ 
s..-, c-;...lt, 
l.\.r~ 
ca. ,..;., n..a 
1)- .......,..__ 
~ 
Iff" il ... _... a. 
1'«·'-' 
r...-..-y.~t.CJ 
........ ·..:...-~ ,_,_,. 
~ ..... t:o.J 
a ... O...,!.o "-'1 
(t-J,.,)I. CJ 
'"'· v,~ r .. Vohr 
"""'·~'·J 
,.,.~~ 
~.oc.: .... 1'-lo..y 
a ... o. .. u~~ 
k.tH. .. .,J( 
Jo- K.cU 
lll.-,f<...l-
v ... H,!a.o. 
u•f4- ,._, .... 
Ill...:.~ 
J,l.kJ. ~ 
~ ... .~. ...... 
..,.. . .... ~ ... l.~ 
\"'""•"'- ro..) 
l!.. r...., 
(t'ol-'-".t.CJ 
.... .. ...:.l...,s..,c;.. .. ~ 
(u ...... G.J 
r.. •. k....,C.~ 
C"'·''"'"'r~J 
.... !..i !.. .... 1--• 
,,.._,.-...,,JJ,, 
a.,.. . s.-t V,'\'~ 
""'"""c:.., 
J.'- tkoo 
....... t:.~ 
a..:.o; U-lC.tll 
.._ ._,. 
........ t..r.. 
'f-... I.;...~ 
C.·! ~~~ 
c... "-r 
;..>.w.-..,. 
A. l l4oW 
.....,... o'Xo-4 
a..-.J...l c.-lo 
,. •• o-! ...... L>J 
.._ .... v~t~~ 
p: .... c ............ f.AJ 
a.,... Y.H.I<.I 
cu.,;.,....._ .. _...., 
J,.. ll L......., 
~·~· ..... ··.J 
t,.. . T.J.~ 
" ..... , ....... , r..J 
-.-:.. ZC.,.I Tk11 •l"d.n..l 
S41u/.zt, Mocl !J, ~~ 
.. · " ' 
er 0'-'-cn-t..Nc Tor tt>:.!.oce c.d .. ~.ted L"'=":!.y 
to intirnith:c .:: lt;:zJ~u wfv, ~'Y r..s.: in t!l.e ~-:h. 
Thc;r r..r.uc: y ;, tc bcbJ ~! ~: :J!":"'U:.irc ll"~' "tc=.u:.. 
at'Jd cJua t? d.;.rn..X'11~t..e ~·r:::"'W A."'t'C'i.:J:-..s anr! .. t;:..:2. 
t~.coif ~i'l t., s:n.t ,:t;~ ~ d.c rc.• w: c{ !oof:~;n Lud.-.r 
x, ;:'l { . 1f';rltu~f lc -.a .!cr '~ ;.'-.e u~ .. ~.: ...-:: .j..., m'l"C:r.c:\1. 
cic.·..trf r . t!.ren::l\Jr::, ;., ut i.-:::::! 'l.tt o! Qc: tD'..d 
l"'..f'Ul.,:!: !o:- {rc.e6ru in t!~ ~~ 
tkun:.,.,; .:h! Am~ri:ont u~:~e: hlr but 
·~b~ the cru:t\ e Jr.rir.! o~ l.~ s.:u .. Jc.n-ts a:-;:! l'l o 
<;'.:i:t ~':'toJ ; ,.., o! [ i .r. )t:i_ ... t,. e~ l~.;. " one c! t!.ttr..c 
t:t tr.lc,:s fr. th.t: lt· · ( :'ll Y h..,. ,....,. .l! f:-:-: .. m ... ~:n n:~n 
c:\.0.1 ,.n:rnctt o! t ."''("1 • ;:; !':'\.: :'\! ""~ rr--')!"C t.."·.::n &f',, .tud 
the ril.it'~·to--::-.,1')· c..f o·!.C'n.. 7:"'1: A.~c-ri-a -~~ ,,..-.>J 
IUJ'tJC: llll"'· ~f ft\. ~ ~ ...,: b :~ 1~c. bdMt • Y'l:.:hfu! . .._ ~1:J, 
L~.c Arr.tr it""3 "X\C h·:rir~;-: o f L:"'-:rly t!\.n.:: 5-;·.t: ~..c.-: n 
l'~~- Jc-:-.s c! eN: c~ . .-·_;rtuc.;,:.n U'C ~:!'""'~~ ct. is ,,.. 
Ar:ter;..,. sr..-cl: &.> t.L,c,iro ••• 
We mu.t b:;d 1l.cl: T;,;:,.! ~ccs-~ ,... 
~urt a:!-J CMr ,_. t- • 
~·. rr.u1: e.r::r:f .,.,l"K;..,., .~., ::.J b..:~ 
Jnl)n.'l r .. f'("')rl :an..! rcnJ.:r t..&.,..: r.-::c-:i..J! ~: ! :"' v.. Urtc-'.! ~ y 
n .. '::!-.-.d Or rl,."'1C •""·' a·e u;.. :c: t!< r :~ f~: j-J i l, 
~.!~\~:~;.:;~~ ~~ ~~,f:;:~~~-a !fi~~ c! cur 
We urtc ' '""' to j~..;,, ~:.:........;. w'-:.'t o-.u krc.,. Aoct'o 
;__,r:, i.1-l U:.: ~1!:, t .; n:: p-r...,.:::!..--: !. - : ~'l T'>..::' o..,: :.;-s.. 
t:-is. C)'Ciihi~.d A-;.,-.:: J I.e .. : :.! ~rc'! I'V"('J., --L'-..t ~.:~ ..... , 
o! !-o(tfuo Lut!-..e:- K.ie~~ ~~;"'<~~d-.~ c-:.'!~· :~ 
..... la!tA--c.r.;l ::.e ~~u:e !.:.: Gc ri(~ · t.:>,~e.. 
NO\V!! 
LJ-,.lC...~ 
C'-. .... , ....... 
So,.J,..:.., 
s...Jowr ,.,.w, 
~,.,;,t.>.!~ 
JJ..o---
e.- a.... 
.l.o·~ 
/I,..(W,......, ... onll 
~. ...... t.,;;. 
r..~...t .,.. 
~~ 
... ~ ... 
.._s...-. ... 
~r.._, 
L·.~C.. 
.:.,.., 
.......... ~ 
,_,. ,,._ 
c.-.. .. -_ .. 
!.;..e..,-·~ 
..._,...,... 
,. l!alll .. ~ ..... ~ 11"::1 -=- .. -- ...... ., 
I c .. ~ .... ,. ~'"::J ~""" v:::- ~Woe I 
I T'-4 ,..,.~ ,.,. ,,...._ a.. n. •~ I 
I Jll 11'c:t n:o~. s.""'· """ T.-t 21, "- T._ I 
I v~., '"~ I 
I :.,-.~-: :-;::::., '---- I 
I I I r:.':::i".u.'l I 
tOm!ITili 10 DHl'iD V.:\RTI~ lnm& Il\G A.\"D niE STUGGU: fOR fRH DOJf l~ TliE SCLTU I I 
JU Wc,t l~.:.h Strcct, Ne>r Yoo:l 27, N. Y, t;~nuiry 6-J;.::o 
CU:. .. tt: J. . tl>;f,p J.tt .!.>!;\ tJr. Cu!:w:r C. ,.,,y,,: CL.',r.~ •! Coft.,.J n;.,·,:u: Hrnr I!C:of.r.tr, !:!o(f 
t.;rict; T ,,.,. ,,; Sat r_;,., Cufr; C....,,.,:~, o:,,~'•': a,rud ;. .. ,.~:""; CA .. ;, .. ,, •I C loti ( l;t';J: •• • F' h'!t C(\)t:c 
ll f .. t. ln-. Hotrf t:~.-no.• f..-J i< k, }tt•. Tl>omu J:.olc?u,}r, ~bl>i £d•ud t:. X!<~; Cu:, .... •l vS.t D.,;. 
.: .... ~ocru I.U..:u 
I I 
I o ............ o--.~ ....... ~ I 
I lio ... ...& ......... M~..., I 
I e-.;., .. To ,.. .. "' -Go L-<h< r.., I , _____ _....:: ...... -- ... 
90 
,. .. _ 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anastaplo, ~9~_ge. The Constitutionalist: Notes on the 
First Amendment. Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1971. 
Barron, Jerome. "Access To The Press -A New First 
Amendment Right," · Harvard Law Review, LXXX (1967), 
p. 1641. 
Bogart, Leo. Strategy In Advertising. New York1 
Harcourt Brace & World, 1967. 
Chafee, Jr,,Zechariah Government and Mass Communications, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 194?. 
Clyde (ed.). An Introduction To Graduate Study In Speech 
and Theatre, East Lansing Michigan: Michigan State 
University Press, 1961, 
Coe, Barbara D. 
New Jersey: 
Advertising Practice, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall Inc,, 1972. 
. . 
Douberley, William. "Resolving 'l'he Free Speech - Free 
Press Dichotomy: Access :To The Press Through 
Advertising. •• University of Florida Law Review, 
XXII (1969), p, 29). 
Editorial,. Advertising Age, June 11, 1973, p. 14. 
EditorialG New York Times, December 18, 1961, p. 26. 
Editorial. New York Times, December 20, 196), p. 28, 
Emerson, Thomas. Toward A General Theory of The First 
Amendmento New Yorkt Vintage Books, 1967. 
• 
The System of Freedom of Expression. New 
Yorks Random House Inc., 1970. 
Emery, M.C. and T.C. Smyth (eds.). Concepts and Issues 
In The Mass Media. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. c. Brown 
Company, 1972. 
Farrar;T. and J, Stevens (eds,), Mass Media and the 
National Experience .. New York: Harper and Row, 
1971. 
91 
92 
Hachten, William. The Supreme Court On Freedom of the 
Press. · Ames, Iowaz The Iowa State University Press, 
1968. 
Jaffe, Louis. "The Editorial Responsibility of the 
Broadcaster& Reflections On Fairness and Access," 
Harvard Law Review, LXXXV (1972), p. 768. 
Lacy, D. Freedom and Communication. Urbana, Illinois: 
Universit-y of Illinois Press, 1968. . . 
Nelson, Harold. Freedom of the Press From Hamilton to 
the Warren Court. Indianapolis' Bobbs - Merrill 
Company, 1967. 
New York Times, October 14, 1973, p. 14 E. 
"Pope Paul in Radio Ads for Quebec Group," Advertising 
Age, October 15, 1973, Pe 2. 
Potter, David. People of Plenty, Chicago: Unive·rsity 
of Chicago Press, 1954. 
"Public Interest Groups Set Variety of Ad Drives," 
Advertising Age, April 23, 1973, p. 132. 
"Recent Cases," Harvard Law Review, LXXXV (1972), p. 689. 
Sandage, c. H. and v. Fryburger (eds.). The Role of 
Advertising. Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin 
Inc., 1960. 
Schwartz, Bernard. The Bill of Rights: A Documentary 
History II, New York: Chelsea House Publishers and 
McGraw Hill Inc., 1971. 
Small, William. To Kill A Messenger: Television News 
and the Real World, New York: Hastings House, 1970. 
Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock. New York: Random House, 
1970. 
Warneryd, Karl-Erik and Kjell Nowak. Mass Communication 
and 'Advertising. Stockholm: Economic Research 
:Institute, A B Svenska Telegrambyran STB, 1967. 
Watzlawick, Paul, Janet Beavin, and Ron Jackson. Prag-
matics of Human Communication. New York: w. w. 
Norton & Company, 1967. 
